Re: [Sframe] John Scudder's No Objection on draft-ietf-sframe-enc-07: (with COMMENT)

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Wed, 03 April 2024 17:04 UTC

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From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2024 13:04:32 -0400
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To: John Scudder <jgs@juniper.net>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-sframe-enc@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-sframe-enc@ietf.org>, "sframe-chairs@ietf.org" <sframe-chairs@ietf.org>, "sframe@ietf.org" <sframe@ietf.org>, Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
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Subject: Re: [Sframe] John Scudder's No Objection on draft-ietf-sframe-enc-07: (with COMMENT)
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Not unreasonable.  Wrote up a PR:

https://github.com/sframe-wg/sframe/pull/197

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 12:39 PM John Scudder <jgs@juniper.net> wrote:

> On Apr 3, 2024, at 11:39 AM, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>
> The high-level message, though, is that `SFrameContext::decrypt()` should
> be a constant-time operation, irrespective of whether the decryption is
> successful or not.  I think the current text is close enough to capture
> that, but would be open to clarifying further.
>
>
> The attack I can imagine that isn’t captured by your discussion is that
> (as hinted in my earlier comment) an attacker on (or in sight range of!)
> the subject endpoint could potentially know by visual inspection, or
> equivalent, that a keyframe had been dropped. Still up to you whether you
> want to take this on board, though. I think the additional clarity provided
> by your specific observation that "`SFrameContext::decrypt()` should be a
> constant-time operation” seems more valuable overall. One way to write that
> could be,
>
> OLD:
>             Invalid ciphertexts SHOULD be discarded
>    in a way that is indistinguishable (to an external observer) from
>    having processed a valid ciphertext.
>
> NEW:
>             Invalid ciphertexts SHOULD be discarded
>    in a way that is indistinguishable (to an external observer) from
>    having processed a valid ciphertext. In particular the decrypt()
>    operation should be constant-time, irrespective of input.
>
> And thanks for the context about compressed CTR.
>
> —John
>