Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt

[David Mandelberg <[e-mail]>]

Hi all,

I believe this draft addresses all of the comments I've received so 
far, and is ready for WGLC. Chairs, please consider this a formal 
request.

Here's a summary of changes from the previous version:

  * In Validation Output Filtering, an origin validation assertion where 
the prefix covers the locally reserved prefix, is no longer removed from 
the RP's output. For private-use prefixes, this change shouldn't be 
significant because there are no public covering routes. For other 
prefixes (e.g., stolen/borrowed public ones), this reduces the 
likelihood of accidentally invalidating an important covering route.
  * The document is now more clear and consistent about use of SLURM 
with non-private INRs.
  * The intended status is now STD instead of BCP. (I think it was BCP 
by mistake.)
  * I removed references to LTAM because LTAM is now dead.
  * I removed references to Suspenders because I think SLURM is ready 
for WGLC and Suspenders is still an individual draft.

On 2016-04-13 17:09, [e-mail] wrote:
> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> directories.
> This draft is a work item of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing of the 
> IETF.
>
>         Title           : Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource
> Management with the RPKI
>         Author          : David Mandelberg
> 	Filename        : draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt
> 	Pages           : 11
> 	Date            : 2016-04-13
>
> Abstract:
>    The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
>    authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
>    Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
>    resources.  Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
>    (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
>    assertions.  In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI 
> to
>    validate the path of a BGP route.  Some ISPs locally use BGP with
>    private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890).  These
>    local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD 
> be
>    considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491).  The
>    mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local
>    assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's
>    assertions about all other INRs.
>
>
> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm/
>
> There's also a htmlized version available at:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01
>
> A diff from the previous version is available at:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of 
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>
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-- 
David Eric Mandelberg / dseomn
http://david.mandelberg.org/