Re: [sidr] BCP for implementing RPKI?

Shane Amante <shane@castlepoint.net> Mon, 04 April 2011 13:38 UTC

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From: Shane Amante <shane@castlepoint.net>
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Date: Mon, 04 Apr 2011 07:40:02 -0600
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To: "George, Wes E [NTK]" <Wesley.E.George@sprint.com>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] BCP for implementing RPKI?
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On Apr 3, 2011, at 18:17 MDT, George, Wes E [NTK] wrote:
> While we have an operational considerations document that covers origin validation, it focuses mainly on policy and implementation
> details of the validation machinery. We don't have anything that covers the back-end of implementing a proper RPKI (from the cache
> upward, rather than downward towards the router). 

+1


> So I think that there is a need for a document that covers things like identity and authority management, minimum levels of security
> for key management, etc.

+1


> I'm happy to help play the part of RPKI n00b to ensure that a draft written to cover this answers the right questions, but for the
> same reason, I cannot help much with actually writing it, and am hoping that there are folks interested in picking up this work.

+1

-shane