[sidr] comment on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol and draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-ops

[Sandra Murphy <[e-mail]>]

Speaking as regular ol' member

The bgpsec-protocol draft has the following text:

   Next, the BGPSEC speaker verifies that the origin AS is authorized to
   advertise the prefix in question.  To do this, consult the valid ROA
   data to obtain a list of AS numbers that are associated with the
   given IP address prefix in the update message.  Then locate the last
   (least recently added) AS number in the Secure_Path portion of the
   BGPSEC_Path attribute.  If the origin AS in the Secure_Path is not in
   the set of AS numbers associated with the given prefix, then the
   BGPSEC update message is 'Not Valid' and the validation algorithm
   terminates.

This text reprises the origin validation algorithm, without some of the more detailed pieces.

I believe it would be better instead to refer to RFC6483 or RFC6811, rather than try to reprise the algorithm.  Something like:  "To do this, the speaker performs the algorithm of RFC6483/RFC6811.  If the result is not Valid, then the BGP Update is 'Not Valid'."

(This seems particularly prudent as we might be reconsidering the validation algorithm.)

This also brought to mind a point I'm curious about.  

Does a bgpsec speaking router have one configuration about the results of the bgpsec validation, or does it have two configurations, one for the results of the origin validation and a second for the results of the bgpsec validation?  Are the two validation states separated?

Should this be a point to be explained in the bgpsec-ops document? 

--Sandy, speaking as regular ol' member