Re: [sidr] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8182 (7239)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 08 December 2022 15:21 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
In-Reply-To: <Y5AjG3AJjHaFIRdv@TomH-802418>
Date: Thu, 08 Dec 2022 10:20:54 -0500
Cc: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>, Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>, IETF SIDR <sidr@ietf.org>, bryan@cobenian.com, Chris Morrow <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, andrew-ietf@liquid.tech, John Scudder <jgs@juniper.net>, tim@ripe.net
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To: Tom Harrison <tomh@apnic.net>
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Subject: Re: [sidr] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8182 (7239)
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RFC 5280 defines the SAI extension, and it says:

   This profile defines one access method to be used when the subject is
   a CA and one access method to be used when the subject is an end
   entity.  Additional access methods may be defined in the future in
   the protocol specifications for other services.

I think it is pretty clear that new access methods are expected to com along over time.

Russ


> On Dec 7, 2022, at 12:22 AM, Tom Harrison <tomh@apnic.net> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Nov 04, 2022 at 04:38:12AM -0700, RFC Errata System wrote:
>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8182,
>> "The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)".
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> You may review the report below and at:
>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7239
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> Type: Technical
>> Reported by: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
>> 
>> Section: 3.2
>> 
>> Original Text
>> -------------
>> Certificate Authorities that use RRDP MUST include an instance of an
>> SIA AccessDescription extension in resource certificates they
>> produce, in addition to the ones defined in [RFC6487]:
>> 
>> Corrected Text
>> --------------
>> Certificate Authorities that use RRDP MUST include an instance of an
>> SIA AccessDescription extension in CA resource certificates they
>> produce, in addition to the ones defined in [RFC6487]:
>> 
>> Notes
>> -----
>> Between draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-04 and
>> draft-ietf-sidr-delta-protocol-05 a bit of text was removed (perhaps
>> because it was considered redundant). But, unfortunately that
>> snippet helped establish important context as to what types of
>> certificates are expected to contain the id-ad-rpkiNotify
>> accessMethod inside the Subject Information Access extension. The
>> text that was removed:
>> 
>> """
>> Relying Parties that do not support this delta protocol MUST MUST NOT
>> reject a CA certificate merely because it has an SIA extension
>> containing this new kind of AccessDescription.
>> """
>> 
>>> From the removed text is is clear that id-ad-rpkiNotify was only
>>> expected to show up on CA certificates. However, without the above
>>> text, Section 3.2 of RFC 8182 is somewhat ambiguous whether
>>> 'resource certificates' is inclusive of EE certificates or not.
>> 
>> RFC 6487 Section 4.8.8.2 sets expectations that only
>> id-ad-signedObject is expected to show up in the SIA of EE
>> certificates "Other AccessMethods MUST NOT be used for an EE
>> certificates's SIA."
>> 
>> The ambiguity in RFC8182 led to one RIR including id-ad-rpkiNotify
>> in the SIA of the EE certificate of all signed objects they produce
>> (such as ROAs). The RIR indicated they'll work to remove
>> id-ad-rpkiNotify from all EE certificates their CA implementation
>> produces.
> 
> I agree with this report.  (APNIC is the RIR referred to in this
> paragraph, and we also found the text to be unclear when we were
> implementing this specification.)
> 
> -Tom
> 
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