[sidr] docco changes from minutes

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Tue, 22 May 2012 23:12 UTC

Return-Path: <randy@psg.com>
X-Original-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E669121F86B6 for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 May 2012 16:12:06 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.349
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.349 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.250, BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id VKrbMbnI9jZh for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 22 May 2012 16:12:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ran.psg.com (ran.psg.com [IPv6:2001:418:1::36]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C4F5D21F869D for <sidr@ietf.org>; Tue, 22 May 2012 16:12:01 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=rair.psg.com.psg.com) by ran.psg.com with esmtp (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <randy@psg.com>) id 1SWyFE-000AoH-NC for sidr@ietf.org; Tue, 22 May 2012 23:12:01 +0000
Date: Wed, 23 May 2012 08:11:59 +0900
Message-ID: <m262bn7qv4.wl%randy@psg.com>
From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: sidr wg list <sidr@ietf.org>
User-Agent: Wanderlust/2.15.9 (Almost Unreal) Emacs/22.3 Mule/5.0 (SAKAKI)
MIME-Version: 1.0 (generated by SEMI 1.14.6 - "Maruoka")
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
Subject: [sidr] docco changes from minutes
X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing <sidr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr>
List-Post: <mailto:sidr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 22 May 2012 23:12:07 -0000

so i reviewed the minutes from last month, looking for what i had to hack
in the docs i edit.  i found very little.  essentially

    <t>A prudent operator will pre-provision each router's 'next' key in
      the RPKI so that, in case of compromise of the current key, there
      is no propagation delay for provisioning the new key.</t>

and

    <t>The operator should be aware that BGPsec, as any other policy
      change, can cause traffic shifts in their network.  And, as with
      normal policy shift practice, a prudent operator has tools and
      methods to predict, measure, modify, etc.</t>

surely there was more.  help!!!

randy