[Sidrops] Re: Charter question for SIDRops on Origin Validation

[[e-mail]]

Hi Ketan, Sue, all,

Origin validation is within scope of SIDROPS, per the following

“The global deployment of Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR), consisting of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Origin Validation of BGP announcements, and BGPsec (RFC 8205<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8205/>) …. Specifically, SIDROPS is responsible for the maintenance of all SIDR components, except BGPsec.”

Cheers,
Med

De : Ketan Talaulikar <[e-mail]>
Envoyé : mardi 17 mars 2026 11:36
À : Job Snijders <[e-mail]>
Cc : Susan Hares <[e-mail]>; SIDRops IETF <[e-mail]>; SIDROps Chairs <[e-mail]>; idr-chairs <[e-mail]>; BOUCADAIR Mohamed INNOV/NET <[e-mail]>
Objet : Re: [Sidrops] Charter question for SIDRops on Origin Validation


+ Med


On Tue, Mar 17, 2026 at 8:57 AM Job Snijders <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Dear Susan,

On Tue, Mar 17, 2026 at 03:12:36AM +0000, Susan Hares wrote:
> The IDR WG is revising its charter. As the maintenance WG for BGP, we
> are trying to make sure that no set of BGP standards get orphaned.


thank you for that!


> SIDR OPS charter states:
> "The global deployment of Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR), consisting of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Origin Validation of BGP announcements, and BGPsec (RFC 8205<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8205/>) is still underway, creating an Internet Routing System consisting of SIDR-aware and non-SIDR-aware networks."
>
> It further states:
>
>   *   Maintain RPKI technology stack.
>   *   Maintain RPKI-Router protocol, including specifying extensions, updates, and new protocol versions.
> And:
>
>   *   Develop solutions for identified issues. This includes in particular:
> .....
>
>      *   Standardizing protocols and protocol extensions to improve operational efficiency and security of SIDR such as Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) and reliable cache synchronization mechanisms.
>
> So, SIDRops - has RPKI-Router, ASPA,
> SIDRops - does not have BGPSec or Origin Validation (RFC6811)
>
> The SIDR chair is silent on the Origin Validation of BGP announcements.
>
> ========
> RFC6811 and its updates (RFC8411, RFC8893) do not specifically belong to SIDRops.
>
> Based on my comment about being the maintainer of the BGP Protocol,
> The IDR chairs wish to make sure RFC6811 and its updates (RFC8411, RFC8893) have a home.
>
> Did you miss this in your charter revision or do you want IDR to maintain
> Origin Validation?


Whoops, this seems a bit of an oversight in the last round of revising
the SIDROPS charter. I think we missed BGP Prefix Origin Validation
(also known as Route Origin Validation, ROV).

I think RFC 6811, RFC 8893, and RFC 8481 and potential -bis projects or
variants thereof belong with SIDROPS and align well with similar existing
adopted work (for example, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification and
draft-ietf-sidrops-spl-verification).

Kind regards,

Job
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