Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-has-no-identity-00

[Randy Bush <[e-mail]>]

> I do not understand the value of the "nonce check".  CMS allows
> multiple parallel signatures.  See RFC 4853 for some clarifications,
> and see RFC 5752 when there are concerns about stripping one of the
> signatures.

i am lost a few meters higher up; which is what i suspect you may be
hinting.  at the start of this tangled thread, ggm asked us to include
an example of useful "bridging" (ggm's term) MTA/RSC signing.

if i had a cms blob signed by an INR CA and by X-CA or whatever, what
can i do with it?  and i most definitely do not mean the mechanics of
signing, proofs of possession, etc.

i do not see how it has more authority to issue an LOA for a PNI than
would be granted by simply using X-CA.

perhaps if X-CA has been used to contract with the issuing RPKI CA, it
could authorize modification of RPKI holdings; but no more so than just
that X-CA.

i suppose that if both signed a blob which somehow encoded that the RPKI
INR signer was authorized to represent the X-CA signer in some
restricted (i hope) class of transactions, the RPKI INR signer could
then issue the LOA for the PNI.  this seems a tenuous and therefore
dangerous chain (the blob's restrictions must be tested to include the
authorization for the LOA[0]), with zero advantage over X-CA just
signing the LOA.

i keep looping, with the X-CA being the inescapable base real world
authority.

i think i'll go shopping. :)

randy

[0] - and who is going down the capybara hole of writing the rfc
      describing the syntax and semantics of these authorizations and
      restrictions?

---
[e-mail]
`gpg --locate-external-keys --auto-key-locate wkd [e-mail]`
signatures are back, thanks to dmarc header butchery