Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-01.txt

Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net> Wed, 11 May 2022 06:29 UTC

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From: Ties de Kock <tdekock@ripe.net>
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Date: Wed, 11 May 2022 08:29:05 +0200
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-01.txt
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Hi Randy,

> On 7 May 2022, at 00:04, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
> 
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-01
> 
> the bad news is
> 
>   If new RPKI data arrive which invalidate the best path, and the
>   router did not keep all alternatives, then it MUST issue a route
>   refresh so those alternatives may be evaluated for best path.

Just to make sure this is the intended behaviour: When new RPKI data arrives
that transitions a 'better' route that was invalid to unknown or valid, the
router will stick to the old preferred route.

It only switches when the best path is invalidated. Do we want to be explicit
about this downside?

Can we simulate or estimate the impact of the specification in section 4?

Kind regards,
Ties

> 
> randy
> 
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