Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-04.txt

Di Ma <madi@rpstir.net> Tue, 15 June 2021 02:35 UTC

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From: Di Ma <madi@rpstir.net>
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Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2021 10:35:29 +0800
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To: Stephen Kent <stkent=40verizon.net@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] draft-ietf-sidrops-6486bis-04.txt
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Steve,

> 
> I propose the following text to begin Section 6:
> 
>   Each RP MUST use the current manifest of a CA to control addition of listed
>   files to the set of signed objects the RP employs for validating basic RPKI
>   objects: certificates, ROAs, and CRLs. Any files not
>   listed on the manifest MUST NOT be used for validation of these objects.
>   However, files not listed on a manifest MAY be employed to validate other
>   signed objects, if the profile of the object type explicitly states that
>   such behavior is allowed. Note that relying on files not listed in a
>   manifest may allow an attacker to effect substitution attacks against such
>   objects.
> Steve
> 

Does your proposal mean we have to extend RFC 3779 or RFC 6487 to generally support an RPKI object noting itself required in MFT?

Or we just need to make RSC/RTA to offer such information?

I think the former will bring more tasks for IETF but may be a good way to enhance the security of the RPKI.

Di