[Sidrops] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Wed, 10 April 2019 03:27 UTC

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Date: Tue, 09 Apr 2019 20:27:05 -0700
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Subject: [Sidrops] Benjamin Kaduk's No Objection on draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: (with COMMENT)
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Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-07: No Objection

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Thank you for keeping the diff from RFC 7730 tidy!


   their CA certificate.  In particular it allows TAs to change the set
   of Internet Number Resources included in the RFC3779 extension of
   their certificate.

Neither "Internet Number" nor "Number Resources" appears in RFC 3779 that I
can see.  (On a quick skim, I'm still not sure if we mean AS number or IP

Section 2.1

   the trust anchor per se.  In the RPKI, certificates contain
   extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779].

(As above, I don't see INRs mentioned in RFC 3779.)

Since comments are new in this rev of TAL, do we want to caution consumers
that implementations may not necessarily support comments yet?

Section 2.3

   The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key.  This key MUST NOT change
   when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR
   extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration, or
   for any reason other than a key change.

(This seems a bit tautological...)

   If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a
   putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the
   entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the

Certain classes of attacker could continue to publish the last-known
certificate as a trust anchor and prevent this withdrawl from taking
effect; we should probably cover that in the security considerations.

Section 2.4

We say that it's RECOMMENDED to have different domains (so as to get
different IP addresses) but this example shows only a single domain.

Section 4

   Note that a Man in the Middle (MITM) cannot produce a CA certificate
   that would be considered valid according to the process described in
   Section 3.  [...]

I think the key part is that the attacker cannot produce a *new* CA
certificate that differs from a legitimate one, but they can MITM the HTTPS
connection and present a legitimate (but potentially stale) CA certificate.

   o  DNS names in Repository Server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the
      wildcard character "*".

Would a Relying Party ever reject the HTTPS connection (and thus, the
delivered TA) if a wildcard certificate is presented for the HTTPS

Section 5

   This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the
   referenced self-signed CA certificate.  Instead, the RP is referred
   to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this
   certificate.  This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it
   also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for
   any resource.  Relying parties should either have great confidence in
   the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust
   anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a
   trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate

Are there any external databases that a RP could consult to affect the
decision of whether to believe that a TA should actually be claiming the
indicated resource(s)?  (It would be a bit silly, given that this is the
RPKI already, but still...)