Re: [Sidrops] [Din] blockchain for IP addresses draft update

David Mazieres <dm-list-ietf-ilc@scs.stanford.edu> Mon, 02 July 2018 15:59 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-ietf-ilc@scs.stanford.edu>
To: Jordi Paillissé Vilanova <jordip@ac.upc.edu>, sidrops@ietf.org, din@irtf.org, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>, sandy@tislabs.com, Greg Skinner <gregskinner0@icloud.com>, leo@vegoda.org, "natal@cisco.com" <natal@cisco.com>, Vina Ermagan <vermagan@cisco.com>, Fabio Maino <fmaino@cisco.com>, Albert Cabellos <acabello@ac.upc.edu>, opsec@ietf.org
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Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 08:59:10 -0700
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Subject: Re: [Sidrops] [Din] blockchain for IP addresses draft update
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Jordi Paillissé Vilanova <jordip@ac.upc.edu> writes:

> (apologies for cross-posting)
>
> Dear all,
>
> We have submitted a new version of the draft addressing comments 
> received both on the mailing list and IETF meetings.
>
> Thanks to all of you for taking the time to read the draft :)
>
> Regards,
>
> Jordi

Very interesting draft.  One high-level comment, I would avoid terms
like "tamper-proof" or really anything-"proof" except possibly in the
context of information-theoretic security, in favor of tamper-resistant.
This is particularly important in the context of blockchains that have
experienced a number of forks in practice and where it would likely take
only a few tens of millions of dollars a day to tamper with history.

I think the draft would benefit from a much finer-grained consideration
of several different forms of proof-of-stake, because there are a number
of assertions that do not hold for all forms of proof of stake.  E.g.,
will there be delegation like peercoin, randomization like algorand,
penalties like Casper, sleepy nodes like snowwhite?

And while of course I'm biased on this issue, I think that a
Byzantine-agreement-based approach like SCP
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mazieres-dinrg-scp/) would work
better than PoS.  SCP is well matched to the Internet peering model,
which we already know is a workable decentralized governance model.  You
may not agree, but it would at least be nice for the document to explain
why you reject this approach.

David