Re: [Sip] Review of draft-kupwade-sip-iba-00

Hadriel Kaplan wrote:
> Cool. So if I understand this right (and I probably don't), ignoring
> rfc4474 identity and IBS for a moment and instead thinking about SRTP
> and IBE: I could use IBE to encrypt the security-descriptions
> attribute value using the intended target's SIP URI as a key, and
> only someone owning that URI (and sharing the same KG) or the KG
> itself could decrypt it to learn the sec-desc cleartext to use?

Actually, there are partial-key models where the KG couldn't decrypt it
either.

There are modes of operation that allow the full private key to be a
product of a secret (retained by the user) and the output of the PKG.
Hence you need to know both parts to decrypt or sign a message.

> -hadriel p.s. the KG would actually be a problem for IBE, wouldn't
> it?  I mean the KG can always decrypt it. (at which point they would
> be the Key Generator Backdoor - aka, the KGB ;)

Yep. Early IB systems worked as you describe. But they don't HAVE to
work that way.

--
Dean

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