Re: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concerning response identity (was RE: Further proceeding with draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05)
"Francois Audet" <audet@nortel.com> Mon, 22 September 2008 16:25 UTC
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Thread-Topic: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concerning response identity (was RE: Further proceeding with draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05)
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From: Francois Audet <audet@nortel.com>
To: "Elwell, John" <john.elwell@siemens.com>, Mary Barnes <mary.barnes@nortel.com>, Cullen Jennings <fluffy@cisco.com>
Cc: sipping <sipping@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concerning response identity (was RE: Further proceeding with draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05)
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I think we need to be a little more specific on what we mean by authentication. I don't believe the reader will get a good feel of why a response is different from a request in regards to authentication. So if we added something like "Unlike requests, responses are not authenticated using bla-bla". And then keep the rest the same as per John's text. > -----Original Message----- > From: sipping-bounces@ietf.org > [mailto:sipping-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Elwell, John > Sent: Monday, September 22, 2008 08:48 > To: Audet, Francois (SC100:3055); Barnes, Mary (RICH2:AR00); > Cullen Jennings > Cc: sipping > Subject: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concerning > response identity (was RE: Further proceeding with > draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05) > > Although there have been very few opinions expressed, those > that have been expressed seem to be roughly along the lines > of my earlier option 4 ("Go ahead with the present update-pai > draft, leaving it open how to achieve authentication of a > response. The present example of how to do this (towards the > end of section 3.3) is broken, so would have to be removed, > or at least qualified.") > > In draft-05, section 3.3 states: > " <t>Section 5 of RFC 3325 requires a proxy to authenticate the > originator of a message before adding a P-Asserted-Identity > header field to the forwarded message. In practice there is > no SIP means to authenticate the sender of a SIP response > message. However, authentication may be possible by other > means. For example, if the proxy has TLS connectivity with > the originator of the response and has previously > authenticated the connected entity (e.g., using SIP digest > authentication at registration time), then the originator of > the response can be considered to be authenticated. In such > circumstances it is permissible for a proxy to insert a > P-Asserted-Identity header field in a SIP response.</t>" > > I would propose to change this to: > " <t>Section 5 of RFC 3325 requires a proxy to authenticate the > originator of a message before adding a P-Asserted-Identity > header field to the forwarded message. How this is achieved > is outside the scope of this document.</t>" > > And then in 4.2.2 it states: > " <t>The proxy behaviour specified in RFC 3325 is applicable to > responses with the following qualifications. A proxy that > receives a response from a node outside the Trust Domain > cannot directly authenticate the UAS by SIP means. Therefore > it MUST NOT include a P-Asserted-Identity header field when > forwarding the response unless it has authenticated the UAS > by other means.</t> > <t><list> > <t>One possible circumstance in which a proxy can > include a P-Asserted-Identity header field when forwarding a > response from a node outside the Trust Domain is when the > proxy has direct TLS connectivity with the UAS and has > authenticated the UA by some other means (e.g., SIP digest > authentication) during that same TLS session.</t> > </list></t>" > > I would propose to change this to: > " <t>The proxy behaviour specified in RFC 3325 is applicable to > responses with the following qualifications. A proxy MUST NOT > include a P-Asserted-Identity header field when forwarding > the response unless it has authenticated the UAS by some > means. The means to authenticate the UAS is outside the scope > of this document.</t> > > Comments? > > John > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Francois Audet [mailto:audet@nortel.com] > > Sent: 19 September 2008 23:56 > > To: Mary Barnes; Elwell, John; Cullen Jennings > > Cc: sipping > > Subject: RE: [Sipping] Further proceeding with > > draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05 > > > > I think we really need to see the exact words... > > > > This is what we say in RFC 4916 (for connected identity for > RFC 4474): > > > > The provision of the identity of the responder in a response > > (commonly called "response identity") is outside the > scope of this > > document. > > > > Note that even if identity were to be conveyed somehow in a > > response, there would in general be difficulty authenticating > > the > > UAS. Providing identity in a separate request allows normal > > authentication techniques to be used. > > > > Is this statement useful? I don't think so. > > > > I am not sure why we believe that response identity IN THIS > CONTEXT is > > any more vulnerable than request indentity. For > RFC4474-style secure > > request identity, sure, but in the case of PAI, requests are not > > authenticated in the first place. > > > > I re-read section 2.2 of > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-peterson-sipping-retarget-00 > > which described the problem of response-identity, and they really > > dealt with forking and it's negative impact on > authenticated response > > identity. I hardly see why this is relevant here with P-AID > since it's > > not like we will use P-AID with RFC 4474 in the first place. > > > > Or am I missing something? > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: sipping-bounces@ietf.org > > > [mailto:sipping-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Barnes, Mary > > > (RICH2:AR00) > > > Sent: Friday, September 19, 2008 14:58 > > > To: Elwell, John; Cullen Jennings > > > Cc: sipping > > > Subject: Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with > > > draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05 > > > > > > Hi all, > > > > > > There was not tremendous response to John's query for > consensus on > > > this document (perhaps due to summer holidays as Cullen > suggested). > > > > > > At this point, with two responses (Paul and Cullen), text > > > (TBD) around option 4 is the most popular, but we really need > > > feedback from others to move this forward. I will ping the other > > > past reviewers in another email (so that responses to the thread > > > don't get too many addressees) but we would really appreciate if > > > others would respond. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Mary. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: sipping-bounces@ietf.org > > > [mailto:sipping-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Elwell, John > > > Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2008 11:37 AM > > > To: Cullen Jennings > > > Cc: sipping > > > Subject: Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with > > > draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05 > > > > > > Cullen, > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: Cullen Jennings [mailto:fluffy@cisco.com] > > > > Sent: 03 September 2008 17:15 > > > > To: Elwell, John > > > > Cc: sipping > > > > Subject: Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with > > > > draft-ietf-sipping-update-pai--05 > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sep 3, 2008, at 1:35 AM, Elwell, John wrote: > > > > > > > > > I received no feedback in the changes made in draft-05 > > > > concerning the > > > > > forward compatibility mechanism, nor on the particular > > > > issue I asked > > > > > for > > > > > comments on: > > > > > > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sipping/current/msg16105.html > > > > > Therefore I assume these changes are acceptable. > > > > > > > > > > > > > Uh, be careful with this sort of assumption. Unless you > > > have consensus > > > > > > > for significant technical changes, you should not be making > > > them to WG > > > > > > > documents. > > > > I'm trying to separating technical changes from editorial > > > changes here > > > > > > > - obviously I think the editor should just make editorial > > > changes and > > > > technical changes which either have, or clearly would > > have, census. > > > > This change is not backwards compatible with some 3325 > > > implementations > > > > > > > and I don't think you have consensus one way or the > other on it. > > > > Silence does not necessarily imply people agree - I suspect > > > few people > > > > > > > have read this. Perhaps my recollection of how this went in the > > > > meeting is wrong - I have not gone back and looked at the notes. > > > [JRE] I hope the changes reflect what we seemed to be reaching > > > consensus on in the meeting. Obviously I wanted to confirm that > > > consensus on the mailing list, as well as confirming that I had > > > implemented it correctly in draft-05. > > > However, looking at the minutes, I see it states "Another > draft can > > > address forward-compatibility issues...". I came away with the > > > feeling that people wanted a forward compatibility requirement > > > placed in the document right now, i.e., in the next > draft, draft-05. > > > I see now that the minutes can be interpreted a different > way, i.e., > > > in a completely separate draft. If I had misinterpreted > the mood of > > > the meeting on this aspect, we can certainly go back to > the text of > > > 04. Other opinions? > > > Nobody shouted when draft-05 appeared, which is why I sent the > > > reminder today. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So we have the one remaining issue concerning response > > > > authentication. > > > > > We had some list discussion on this, the last one > being on 20th > > > > > August: > > > > > > > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sipping/current/msg16121.html > > > > > > > > > > The use of PAI in responses is something that needs > clarifying, > > > > > because RFC 3325 is ambiguous (sometimes it talks about SIP > > > > > messages, other times it specifically talks about > > > requests). In one > > > > > place > > > > it actually > > > > > states "message (request or response)". > > > > > > > > > > So I think we have the following options: > > > > > > > > > > 1. Say nothing about responses at all, thereby leaving us > > > with the > > > > > ambiguity that exists in RFC 3325. I don't think this is > > > a sensible > > > > > option. A lot of the value of updating RFC 3325 is lost > > > if we don't > > > > > tackle the response ambiguity issue. > > > > > > > > > > 2. Clarify the situation by stating that PAI (and PPI) > > > MUST NOT be > > > > > used in responses. I would be very reluctant to go down this > > > > path, since I > > > > > know there is a lot of use of PAI in responses (e.g., > in 3GPP). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 3. Devise a mechanism that exploits TLS to achieve > > authenticated > > > > > response identity and use this in the update-pai draft. > > As Cullen > > > > > pointed out, this needs to be a separate and > > non-trivial piece of > > > > > work, probably done in the SIP WG. Waiting for this > > would hold up > > > > update-pai > > > > > for a considerable time. > > > > > > > > > > 4. Go ahead with the present update-pai draft, leaving it > > > > open how to > > > > > achieve authentication of a response. The present example > > > > of how to do > > > > > this (towards the end of section 3.3) is broken, so would > > > have to be > > > > > > > > removed, or at least qualified. > > > > > > > > > > Any other options? > > > > > > > > > Saying is "MUST NOT be used" is not the right path since > > at least > > > > some people want to leave the door open to adding this > in future > > > > specifications. Describing how to do is not something that > > > should be > > > > done as an update to 3325 because the solution to > > response identity > > > > have a wider implication than just PAI - if we are going to > > > do that, > > > > we should do it in some separate draft in SIP. If folks > > agree with > > > > that, it seems like something along lines of option 4 is > > the right > > > > path where we say that PAI is not currently defined for > > > responses but > > > > future specifications may do so. I think it is also > > > important for the > > > > draft to document some of the reasons around why it is not > > > defined for > > > > > > > responses. > > > [JRE] Your proposal seems to be a toned down version of option 4, > > > but basically I agree - its just a matter of finding the right > > > words. Let's see what other opinions we get. > > > > > > John > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Sipping mailing list > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping > > > This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP Use > > > sip-implementors@cs.columbia.edu for questions on current sip Use > > > sip@ietf.org for new developments of core SIP > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Sipping mailing list > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping > > > This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP Use > > > sip-implementors@cs.columbia.edu for questions on current sip Use > > > sip@ietf.org for new developments of core SIP > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Sipping mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping > This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP > Use sip-implementors@cs.columbia.edu for questions on current > sip Use sip@ietf.org for new developments of core SIP > _______________________________________________ Sipping mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sipping This list is for NEW development of the application of SIP Use sip-implementors@cs.columbia.edu for questions on current sip Use sip@ietf.org for new developments of core SIP
- [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-sipp… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Cullen Jennings
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Paul Kyzivat
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Cullen Jennings
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Mary Barnes
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Francois Audet
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Elwell, John
- [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concerning… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Francois Audet
- Re: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concer… Francois Audet
- Re: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concer… Vijay K. Gurbani
- Re: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concer… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Proposed text for update-pai concer… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Cullen Jennings
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Elwell, John
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Cullen Jennings
- Re: [Sipping] Further proceeding with draft-ietf-… Elwell, John