Re: [Spasm] Last Call: <draft-ietf-lamps-eai-addresses-05.txt> (Internationalized Email Addresses in X.509 certificates) to Proposed Standard

[Wei Chuang <[e-mail]>]

The latest draft 08 is up:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-lamps-eai-addresses-08

The diff is:
https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-lamps-eai-addresses-08.txt

This draft attempts to capture Viktor's name constraint verifier logic, and
illustrate the examples in the diagrams.

-Wei


On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 10:22 AM, Wei Chuang <[e-mail]> wrote:

> There seems to be a consensus here and internally to the changes that
> Viktor proposes.  We can put that in the next draft update.
>
> -Wei
>
> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 1:34 AM, tom p. <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Viktor Dukhovni" <[e-mail]>
>> To: <[e-mail]>; "IETF general list" <[e-mail]>
>> Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2017 3:19 AM
>> > On Mar 8, 2017, at 8:17 PM, Wei Chuang <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> >
>> > Okay.  I think the direction then is to have SmtpUTF8Name respect
>> rfc822Name name constraints and vice versa.
>>
>> Well, no, the simplest proposal on the table is for SmtpUTF8Name to
>> be *prohibited* when rfc822Name constraints are present and SmtpUTF8Name
>> constraints are not.  When both present, they can operate independently.
>>
>> <tp>
>>
>> Getting security right can be tricky as the legion of failed attempts
>> that make it to RFC testify but what you are proposing here seems so
>> simple, so obviously the right thing to do that I am puzzled, bewildered
>> even, that anyone can disagree with you.
>>
>> Tom Petch
>>
>> The verifier logic is then:
>>
>> 1. If neither rfc822Name constraints nor SmtpUTF8Name constraints
>>            are present in any CA certificate in the chain, any mixture
>> of
>>            rfc822Name and SmtpUTF8Name SAN elements is valid.
>>
>> 2. If some certificate in the chain contains *only* rfc822Name
>>    constraints, then these apply to rfc822Name SAN elements, but
>>    all SmtpUTF8Names are prohibited.
>>
>> 3. When both types of constraints are present in all CA certificates
>>            that have either type, then constraints for each SAN type are
>>    exclusively based on just the corresponding constraint type.
>>
>> 4. If some certificate in the chain contains only SmtpUTF8Name
>>      constraints then those are unavoidably at risk of bypass via
>>            rfc822Name SAN elements when processed by legacy verifiers.
>>    Therefore, this should be avoided, and the CA needs to
>>      publish rfc822Name constraints that prevent bypass.  Such
>>    constraints *need not* be equivalent (not always possible)
>>    to the desired SmtpUTF8Name constraints.  Rather, it suffices
>>    to not permit rfc822Name elements that would be prohibited
>>    if they were simply cut/pasted (with no A-label to U-label
>>            conversions) as SmtpUTF8Name elements.  It is not necessary
>>    for these to permit everything that SmtpUTF8Name permits.
>>
>> Thus for example, if SmtpUtf8Name only permits addresses in the non
>> NR-LDH
>> domain "духовный.org <http://xn--b1adqpd3ao5c.org>" (or a specific set
>> of addresses in such a domain),
>> then the corresponding rfc822Name constraint could just permit "." (or
>> the
>> reserved "invalid" TLD if that's preferable) which is not a usable email
>> domain.  This ensures that only the permitted SmtpUTF8Name SANs are used
>> and no rfc822Name SANs are used.
>>
>> If, instead the Smtp8Name constraints are excluded non-ASCII address
>> forms,
>> then since these have no literal rfc822Name equivalents, the rfc822Name
>> constraints can be omitted with the same effect.
>>
>> Only when the intention is to permit NR-LDH domains with either ASCII or
>> UTF-8 localparts (or an all-ASCII full address) do the rfc822Name and
>> SmtpUTF8Name constraints need to be fully equivalent.  This is of course
>> trivial to do.  Just cut/paste the same string into both types of
>> constraint.
>>
>> --
>> Viktor.
>>
>>
>