Re: [lamps] Adoption call for draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash

> try and practice algorithmic pluralism in the way we define things

Personally, I am not sure algorithmic pluralism for the sake of variety is a good idea. Integrating and using only new algorithms that make sense is a better one imo.
I can’t think of a case where SHA-3 would be preferred over SHAKEs, but I am open to suggestions.

From: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Michael StJohns
Sent: Saturday, October 28, 2023 11:50 PM
To: spasm@ietf.org
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] Adoption call for draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

IMHO - These are somewhat orthogonal items.   Russ' document is useful irrespective of the Mike's KEM stuff, and I'd like to see it move forward on that basis.

(also, https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/computer-security-objects-register/algorithm-registration has the OID registration for id-sha3-256, so for the use Mike as asking about, it's unclear his document actually depends on Russ' document.  That said, its usually useful to have an IETF public of the NIST allocations as RFCs tend to be a bit easier to find for our participants).

If you want draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem to use Shake exclusively, that's more a discussion that needs to happen on the list with respect to that draft.  Alternately, do what is more flexible and define multiple kda-??? KEY-DERIVATION ::={} constructs to support both shake and sha3.

So I'd suggest it may be better to avoid discussions about which is better and try and practice algorithmic pluralism in the way we define things.  In other words, allocate top level OIDs for both a shake and sha3 variant of the KDF and include those in the ASN1.

Later, Mike

On 10/28/2023 10:37 PM, Kampanakis, Panos wrote:
Hi Mike,

> I guess this is a design choice that the WG can discuss. We could instead use id-shake-256 from RFC8702, which is usable as a digest algorithm as per section 3.1, but why? If what I actually want is a hash function, then why can’t I have a hash function?

I suggest to discuss this in IETF-118. SHAKEs are XOFs but can be used just fine as hashes with constant output size. Their performance is better, and generally that is the reason they have be favored and more adopted than SHA-3 (in the same family).

From: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org><mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org> On Behalf Of Mike Ounsworth
Sent: Saturday, October 28, 2023 2:08 PM
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com><mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>; Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos@amazon.com><mailto:kpanos@amazon.com>
Cc: LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org><mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] [EXTERNAL] Re: Adoption call for draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Panos,

Specifically, draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem instantiates RSA-KEM (RFC5990bis) with:
keyDerivationFunction  kda-kdf3 with id-sha3-256
See:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem-02#name-rsa-kem-parameters

Therefore, I need an OID for id-sha3-256.

I guess this is a design choice that the WG can discuss. We could instead use id-shake-256 from RFC8702, which is usable as a digest algorithm as per section 3.1, but why? If what I actually want is a hash function, then why can’t I have a hash function?

- Mike Ounsworth
________________________________
From: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org>> on behalf of Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com<mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>>
Sent: Saturday, October 28, 2023 10:44:57 AM
To: Panos Kampanakis <kpanos@amazon.com<mailto:kpanos@amazon.com>>
Cc: LAMPS <spasm@ietf.org<mailto:spasm@ietf.org>>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [lamps] Adoption call for draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash

Panos: Mike Ounsworth needs these OIDs to be available, and the easiest solution was to just publish the previously abandoned I-D. Russ On Oct 27, 2023, at 11: 00 PM, Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos=40amazon. com@ dmarc. ietf. org><mailto:kpanos=40amazon. com@ dmarc. ietf. org> wrote: Hi Russ,

Panos:

Mike Ounsworth needs these OIDs to be available, and the easiest solution was to just publish the previously abandoned I-D.

Russ

On Oct 27, 2023, at 11:00 PM, Kampanakis, Panos <kpanos=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:kpanos=40amazon.com@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:

Hi Russ,

I was under the impression that SHAKEs for CMS and X.509 would suffice for introducing the Keccak family to these standards. SHAKEs have the same security and better performance. I thought that was the reason draft-turner-lamps-adding-sha3-to-pkix never made it.

Is there a reason why someone would use SHA-3 in CMS instead of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 (RFC8702)?

From: Spasm <spasm-bounces@ietf.org<mailto:spasm-bounces@ietf.org>> On Behalf Of Tim Hollebeek
Sent: Friday, October 27, 2023 11:39 AM
To: SPASM <spasm@ietf.org<mailto:spasm@ietf.org>>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] Adoption call for draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello,

Russ has asked for an adoption call for this short document that explains how to
use SHA-3 with CMS.  Since people may be traveling to IETF 118, we’ll do a three
week adoption call.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!btMHx3oQg1XcdsmiDk3zQn-HVGxUExFHzJp0v2bwunfFVR3P8235FQ_QH4pzRkyD49fJSywzek8dgSw-P9DqGArWDMhf$>

Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using the four one-way
   hash functions in the SHA3 family with the Cryptographic Message
   Syntax (CMS).

Please indicate whether you support adoption, and optionally indicate why, on
the list by 17 November 2023.

For the chairs,

-Tim

_______________________________________________
Spasm mailing list
Spasm@ietf.org<mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!btMHx3oQg1XcdsmiDk3zQn-HVGxUExFHzJp0v2bwunfFVR3P8235FQ_QH4pzRkyD49fJSywzek8dgSw-P9DqGMDI1k9b$>

Any email and files/attachments transmitted with it are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom they are addressed. If this message has been sent to you in error, you must not copy, distribute or disclose of the information it contains. Please notify Entrust immediately and delete the message from your system.

_______________________________________________

Spasm mailing list

Spasm@ietf.org<mailto:Spasm@ietf.org>

https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm