[lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KEM and ML-DSA private key format Specifications
Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com> Tue, 28 January 2025 17:37 UTC
Return-Path: <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
X-Original-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: spasm@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D9954C180B58; Tue, 28 Jan 2025 09:37:59 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.803
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.803 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, HTML_FONT_LOW_CONTRAST=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_SAFE_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=entrust.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id bM9MfHA2tAqZ; Tue, 28 Jan 2025 09:37:55 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mx07-0015a003.pphosted.com (mx07-0015a003.pphosted.com [185.132.183.227]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4B5CC14F6A1; Tue, 28 Jan 2025 09:37:54 -0800 (PST)
Received: from pps.filterd (m0242864.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx08-0015a003.pphosted.com (8.18.1.2/8.18.1.2) with ESMTP id 50SDBEMY031301; Tue, 28 Jan 2025 11:36:59 -0600
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=entrust.com; h= cc:content-type:date:from:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:to; s=mail1; bh=GzAVhPltC4fkbbBKfSzFwmH3u3nz e/Q5t5ogKIfDPbg=; b=d7AOeXGNPs2KA9amGtc8/Q4SjdXj5cp08rmhPx1Ab7Vf kHTpHSdUb4Ciao4B1pAE4ATn55DmOXWV18BTsT4twe1Pb/NdxKaLXUf3/HyqvTR5 FidqoYOGHmfJPwTvrinO8L8mPMcPOR+MX5LECQ/wt+oo6gBnJA3bra7XYl7Em9gG DeOm7FOTImg15Xq0yxTq4HQYlrUMM4dpVgq7AlbBwl0lLx64IpLNUR/wcFz2IkMa snbZzY1z9c1RFaoCUhCvTnxWqth3lfImHPJL4JDK1G25nYk2RJge6xP6YHFDBvji hCNJQP+SgA2CABclJIvnqJGCZVSGenAVwMjlhoDuNA==
Received: from nam11-bn8-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com (mail-bn8nam11lp2177.outbound.protection.outlook.com [104.47.58.177]) by mx08-0015a003.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 44eywa157v-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 28 Jan 2025 11:36:58 -0600 (CST)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector10001; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=YwrVlUhsPQIZz8nqUf9IULToFr/mKKHYUjdbWi9GZRm/9uhybL+QSqnWORE1ifPMdnE5AV4LUiEAcRslm+EEA+UTvjV5R0/O1dgDbAO/9Ec0aDCaMJEs6BbsPIBRqWCGja3xcp3d15smy3INo2EExttuqoijgs7zJNB0kd0SU3RFHVgBYGdGTCqRdg1DN7KKPWLdVu4CLkEtWEbq3uWEn6iSXoeXXCPD5q7o7eknKVFIc8viZJbTdEcNmuz5rbgOmtpTpl202eDHn7Cv4W3s7g4QC8vYa2ReLfrWOkfcM1DeCaBkzVMrmtB6zDFIKgiqwcCDzocBSQOJCkELDikqeQ==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector10001; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=5ZHN5c7eak5yU63HesPSIll9Fr8T6WAZmKU8eS+cHdc=; b=g9VXLCkasfkdTifj59nZLHxSGWZKVY+HTq/rHHA3NU5US1xk2hxfivkjwOp3cDv2GnrOOlP0ykHFdHoo0hCkkW/IR8knjSSTNkAOOZvUwV21dt0TC+LuPpecKygYORB1D5Zj6lC4p7teT6hAyqCFffNZxDVKAVIeuvHDum3zKYkVRBujDnydCbRs4Va3e8Y3YrNS3gLJb2SDkfApsZoJ/ykPdb09OI3PGnrFWsIrNd5gdgvBPO8VC7mGn1E8jf7YpddHrBgsa4QLyWl0HJbI918WZx2hKqWJxzeUlJDeC5OYfdpeollITEOmn8n0BAx4zCjy5togAa6lcsHxjDwF2Q==
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=entrust.com; dmarc=pass action=none header.from=entrust.com; dkim=pass header.d=entrust.com; arc=none
Received: from CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:610:100::20) by SA3PR11MB7434.namprd11.prod.outlook.com (2603:10b6:806:306::13) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.20.8377.20; Tue, 28 Jan 2025 17:36:55 +0000
Received: from CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::b93d:b2d:3ad8:9702]) by CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com ([fe80::b93d:b2d:3ad8:9702%5]) with mapi id 15.20.8377.021; Tue, 28 Jan 2025 17:36:55 +0000
From: Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com>
To: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Thread-Topic: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KEM and ML-DSA private key format Specifications
Thread-Index: AQHbcagO7G7fxS64WESr7qyMNNyzabMsbwoAgAAB/LA=
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 17:36:55 +0000
Message-ID: <CH0PR11MB5739F2D8E21ED26C2970C9FC9FEF2@CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
References: <Z4-ph-f_2sm5JTS2@chardros.imrryr.org> <40255C72-BC3B-4A34-89A1-1E6A941EC785@vigilsec.com> <E48F2AC4-C1EC-47C0-B09B-F496F4F6C358@sn3rd.com>
In-Reply-To: <E48F2AC4-C1EC-47C0-B09B-F496F4F6C358@sn3rd.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach: yes
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
x-ms-publictraffictype: Email
x-ms-traffictypediagnostic: CH0PR11MB5739:EE_|SA3PR11MB7434:EE_
x-ms-office365-filtering-correlation-id: c47e443f-59a0-46fd-ca3a-08dd3fc25bda
x-ms-exchange-senderadcheck: 1
x-ms-exchange-antispam-relay: 0
x-microsoft-antispam: BCL:0;ARA:13230040|366016|7416014|376014|1800799024|4022899009|8096899003|13003099007|38070700018|7053199007;
x-microsoft-antispam-message-info: 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
x-forefront-antispam-report: CIP:255.255.255.255;CTRY:;LANG:en;SCL:1;SRV:;IPV:NLI;SFV:NSPM;H:CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com;PTR:;CAT:NONE;SFS:(13230040)(366016)(7416014)(376014)(1800799024)(4022899009)(8096899003)(13003099007)(38070700018)(7053199007);DIR:OUT;SFP:1102;
x-ms-exchange-antispam-messagedata-chunkcount: 1
x-ms-exchange-antispam-messagedata-0: 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
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg="SHA1"; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0076_01DB7178.EDE51870"
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-OriginatorOrg: entrust.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthAs: Internal
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-AuthSource: CH0PR11MB5739.namprd11.prod.outlook.com
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-Network-Message-Id: c47e443f-59a0-46fd-ca3a-08dd3fc25bda
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-originalarrivaltime: 28 Jan 2025 17:36:55.3414 (UTC)
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-fromentityheader: Hosted
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-id: f46cf439-27ef-4acf-a800-15072bb7ddc1
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-mailboxtype: HOSTED
X-MS-Exchange-CrossTenant-userprincipalname: vgRqHwXhvQuRFjVgmrSuFcgEd0SCr8R7RM8FjpSylkqkY2WE9/msTOLX7Yvk+xL5oWSEl0JtSvBOxSTvc6NDAkCUyOTQv/7AiQbccDZneJ0=
X-MS-Exchange-Transport-CrossTenantHeadersStamped: SA3PR11MB7434
X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=OKLd3TaB c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=679915bb cx=c_pps a=v3ez6FdVe4RSF1xj2bRqRw==:117 a=wKuvFiaSGQ0qltdbU6+NXLB8nM8=:19 a=Ol13hO9ccFRV9qXi2t6ftBPywas=:19 a=xqWC_Br6kY4A:10 a=VdSt8ZQiCzkA:10 a=dVDJzTMCqzgA:10 a=FEbzDYiKvWYA:10 a=mkMtH7XpAAAA:8 a=aFtGNCwJAAAA:8 a=9drkRKooAAAA:8 a=BivtZg0fAAAA:8 a=tGX7uwomAAAA:8 a=48vgC7mUAAAA:8 a=20KFwNOVAAAA:8 a=Ntg_Zx-WAAAA:8 a=srbWZ79VAAAA:8 a=lyf1682xAAAA:8 a=D3By3HU7AAAA:8 a=XUe_gMu_AAAA:8 a=FKY7v4bjAAAA:8 a=qR8P9fLQA55dBSTVMwEA:9 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 a=yMhMjlubAAAA:8 a=SSmOFEACAAAA:8 a=CszCNUHZ65LM03Wre5sA:9 a=T1KSbhVONA9nCBUy:21 a=gKO2Hq4RSVkA:10 a=UiCQ7L4-1S4A:10 a=hTZeC7Yk6K0A:10 a=frz4AuCg-hUA:10 a=lqcHg5cX4UMA:10 a=xuhc6EK2SKIbAodJPdgA:9 a=ZVk8-NSrHBgA:10 a=30ssDGKg3p0A:10 a=I9Slk6e--tAXHahELIuT:22 a=37_LVEjxSQTuOH1zQYhg:22 a=6cjEHb-scXTEQ_tbBdHN:22 a=6hzDGdwgND3JRs1QQWkJ:22 a=ZFOOzkjxzLGrPE5HuMia:22 a=RUfouJl5KNV7104ufCm4:22 a=Bn1aTw2KtwgCNxFPT5CS:22 a=22KFQSEqVl9V9wpDgu0m:22 a=GbhPPLKizaWC3bbbynJf:22 a=Hyxxk7IO8alR8e2HbrPC:22
X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: ZxYXU8mQ2cHLb13DKdZQp35j4vHLfVqx
X-Proofpoint-GUID: ZxYXU8mQ2cHLb13DKdZQp35j4vHLfVqx
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1057,Hydra:6.0.680,FMLib:17.12.68.34 definitions=2025-01-28_04,2025-01-27_01,2024-11-22_01
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 clxscore=1015 spamscore=0 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 classifier=spam authscore=0 adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.21.0-2411120000 definitions=main-2501280129
Message-ID-Hash: XEK6PN34MINPMPMX47OI4RWJ5337Q6XS
X-Message-ID-Hash: XEK6PN34MINPMPMX47OI4RWJ5337Q6XS
X-MailFrom: Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-spasm.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: "spasm@ietf.org" <spasm@ietf.org>, "lamps-chairs@ietf.org" <lamps-chairs@ietf.org>, "lamps-ads@ietf.org" <lamps-ads@ietf.org>, Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>, Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>, David Hook <dgh@bouncycastle.org>, Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>, Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>, Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KEM and ML-DSA private key format Specifications
List-Id: This is the mail list for the LAMPS Working Group <spasm.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/spasm/f61xxYl2vto1nMayPX8B8oG7CJ4>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm>
List-Help: <mailto:spasm-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:spasm-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:spasm@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:spasm-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:spasm-leave@ietf.org>
Hi Sean, I would vote to rule out Seed-Only and New OID. Seed-only: since FIPS / CMVP / PKCS#11 give the vendor the choice of which private key format to support, there will be some hardware that only supports Expanded. I forsee headaches in my future when the hardware those are on starts failing and we need to get those keys out and we have no standard software key format that will carry them. New OID: I hope you don’t mean that a public key certificate will have to advertise what format its private key is in? Even having one set of OIDs for public key and sigAlg, and then a separate set of OIDs for private key sounds like a mess. Ughm, AlgorithmIdentifier params? Or maybe OneAsymmetricKey attributes? This sorta metadata seems sortof exactly what those are for. --- Mike Ounsworth From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Sent: Tuesday, January 28, 2025 11:22 AM To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Cc: spasm@ietf.org; lamps-chairs@ietf.org; lamps-ads@ietf.org; Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com>; Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>; David Hook <dgh@bouncycastle.org>; Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>; Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>; Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>; Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KEM and ML-DSA private key format Specifications With SEED being okay, my preferences in order are: - seed only then - seed + expanded key using SIZE constraints then - seed + expanded key using a tag (SEQ or CHOICE) then - new OIDs spt > On Jan 28, 2025, at 12: 12 PM, Russ Housley <housley@ vigilsec. com> With SEED being okay, my preferences in order are: - seed only then - seed + expanded key using SIZE constraints then - seed + expanded key using a tag (SEQ or CHOICE) then - new OIDs spt > On Jan 28, 2025, at 12:12 PM, Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com> > wrote: > > For the whole mail list, the following mail was just received from Dustin Moody at NIST... > > > From: "Moody, Dustin (Fed)" <dustin.moody@nist.gov <mailto:dustin.moody@nist.gov> > > Subject: Re: The ML-KEM SEEDs thing > Date: January 28, 2025 at 12:07:49 PM EST > To: David Hook <David.Hook@keyfactor.com <mailto:David.Hook@keyfactor.com> >, Mike Ounsworth <Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com <mailto:Mike.Ounsworth@entrust.com> >, "Souppaya, Murugiah P. (Fed)" <murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov <mailto:murugiah.souppaya@nist.gov> > > Cc: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com> >, Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org <mailto:tjh@openssl.org> >, Tim Hollebeek <tim.hollebeek@digicert.com <mailto:tim.hollebeek@digicert.com> >, John Gray <John.Gray@entrust.com <mailto:John.Gray@entrust.com> >, Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org <mailto:viktor@dukhovni.org> > > > Mike, David, and anybody else, > > We plan to post this text on our FIPS 203 and 204 websites in some fashion shortly. We've discussed it with the CMVP, and we are all in agreement. > > Q: Are cryptographic modules implementing FIPS 203 or FIPS 204 allowed to use seeds as the default key format instead of expanded keys? For example, in FIPS 203, can a cryptographic module store a 64-byte seed (d, z) instead of the output (dk, ek) of Algorithm 19 (ML-KEM.KeyGen), and compute (dk, ek) as needed via (dk, ek) <-- ML-KEM.KeyGen_internal(d, z)? > > A: For both FIPS 203 and FIPS 204, a KeyGen seed is considered an acceptable alternative format for a key-pair, or for the private (i.e., decapsulation or signing) key. In particular, generating the seed in one cryptographic module and then importing it into another cryptographic module is allowed. > > Hopefully this is clear, and answers the question. > > Dustin > > > >> On Jan 21, 2025, at 9:04 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org <mailto:ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> > wrote: >> >> Dear LAMPS WG particants, chairs and ADs, >> >> We, the undersigned, would respectfully appreciate the IETF WGLC >> on private format key specifications for PQ algorithms, namely >> draft-ietf-lamps-kyber-certificates-07 and >> draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-06, being extended until >> the end of January for WG members and other interested parties to >> be able to fully consider the information outlined in this >> document. Presently we feel we are unable to both serve our user >> bases and conform to the proposed specification, and have little >> choice but to offer our users alternative private key formats. >> >> We will represent keys in a manner that maximises their usability >> for our users. Specifically, the simplest ASN.1 encoding (see >> below) that can represent the {SEED}, the private/secret {KEY}, or >> both. We do acknowledge that our case is from the perspective of >> hindsight and that it is very unlikely that previous comments on >> the IETF WGLC drafts would have been in a position to take these >> things into account. >> >> For those who do not closely follow the PKCS#11 and KMIP technical >> committees in OASIS Open, both of those standards have been >> tracking the various NIST specification updates and final >> publication and have early adopters working across ML-KEM, ML-DSA >> and SLH-DSA. >> >> The consolidated viewpoint within the PKCS#11 and KMIP TCs is that >> we cannot mandate that all implementations (especially HW-based) >> must be able to support import and export of the SEED. >> >> For those not familiar with PKCS#11 version 3.2, which adds >> support for ML-KEM and ML-DSA the definitions for the private key >> for each algorithm are formed using three attributes - >> CKA_PARAMETER_SET, CKA_SEED and CKA_VALUE. The latest draft of >> PKCS#11 v3.2 is available at >> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://groups.oasis-open.org/higherlogic/ws/public/download/72453/pkcs11-spec-v3.2-wd08.docx__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIN7KJWCk$ <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/groups.oasis-open.org/higherlogic/ws/public/download/72453/pkcs11-spec-v3.2-wd08.docx__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIN7KJWCk$> >> >> The PKCS#11 specification explicitly states the following: >> >> At least one of CKA_SEED and CKA_VALUE must be specified on >> C_CreateObject. Tokens may reject creation requests that only >> specify one of these values. For highest compatibility >> applications should set both. >> >> Similarly, for KMIP version 3.0 which adds support for ML-KEM and >> ML-DSA, the technical committee is closely aligned with the >> PKCS#11 technical committee and mirrors the recommendation to >> return both for maximum interoperability. The update delta to the >> latest draft of KMIP v3.0 is available at >> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://groups.oasis-open.org/higherlogic/ws/public/download/72473/kmip-spec-v3.0-wd18-markup.pdf/latest__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIDFxDyBw$ <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/groups.oasis-open.org/higherlogic/ws/public/download/72473/kmip-spec-v3.0-wd18-markup.pdf/latest__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIDFxDyBw$> >> >> The KMIP specification explicitly states the following: >> >> At least one of Seed and Key SHALL be specified. >> Implementations MAY reject operations involving managed >> objects using this Key Format if only one of these values is >> specified and that value is not supported by the underlying >> implementation. For maximum interoperability applications >> SHOULD set both Seed and Key. >> >> The various IETF drafts have operated on the assumption that it is >> possible to mandate {SEED} and that all other standards will >> correspondingly mandate it and that all the various >> implementations in cryptographic toolkits will also provide >> interfaces that always support the retention, import and export of >> the {SEED}. >> >> The PKCS#11 and KMIP standards do not share this IETF assumption. >> Once you accept that multiple formats for import and export need >> to be supported then an encoding format to support multiple >> formats must be defined. >> >> For a variety of reasons other standards groups and users have >> reached a different view to that of the IETF. We feel it would be >> a distraction at this time to debate the legitimacy of those >> reasons, our view is that we simply need to be able to support >> those users by implementing a more flexible private key format. >> >> Maximum interoperability necessitates that implementations should >> export the {SEED} and the private {KEY} if possible, or just the >> private {KEY} (if the {SEED} is unavailable). For imports, >> whichever of these are supported by the ultimate implementation >> should be used (i.e. if the underlying cryptographic module or >> hardware solution supports {SEED} as an input, it should be used; >> if it does not then the private {KEY} should be used). In short, >> {SEED + KEY} is recommended, {KEY} is mandatory to support, and >> {SEED} is optional to support. >> >> Separately, the decision to remove the ASN.1 encoding from the >> PrivateKey in PKCS#8 format is not only against standing and >> expected practice, but doesn't leave a sustainable solution to >> support both formats. PKCS#8 is ASN.1 at its core, and the use of >> PKCS#8 should reflect that (and does with every other algorithm). >> When combined with the requirement to support multiple formats, >> using ASN.1 to represent the alternatives is the natural outcome. >> >> Like the IETF (“"rough consensus and running code"), actual >> implementation experience is critically important to PKCS#11, >> KMIP, OpenSSL, Bouncy Castle, and other major standards and >> implementations. Within OpenSSL, our collective experience is that >> length-based discrimination to distinguish input formats is >> fragile and should be avoided. Unambiguous ASN.1 tagging avoids >> such heuristics and better aligns with how the keys of all other >> algorithms are handled. >> >> Both OpenSSL and Bouncy Castle have implemented support for the >> various changing formats over time - and attempted to maximise >> interoperability. The resulting code necessitated determination of >> the format by performing length check and other heuristics and as >> such is considered an undesirable approach. The history of such >> heuristics based code suggests that it is likely to result in CVEs >> as it results in additional complications. >> >> Flexibility on input allows us to interoperate with other >> implementations, however, absent a format that can represent both >> the {SEED} and {KEY}, when we come to selecting an output format >> we'd have to place the burden on the user to determine which to >> choose. If {SEED}-only is selected there are interoperability >> issues, if {KEY}-only is selected there are interoperability >> issues. This leads to a conclusion that the maximally >> interoperable format is {SEED + KEY}. >> >> As interoperability is an industry-wide guiding principle, we have >> selected to output {SEED + KEY}, when possible, and {KEY} or >> {SEED} (whichever is available) otherwise. This will be in our >> next release (for OpenSSL this is version 3.5 which will be >> released in April 2025; for Bouncy Castle, this is version BC Java >> 1.81 which will be released April 2025). >> >> Therefore, the private key format that best serves our users and >> we are advocating the IETF adopt is: >> >> PrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { >> seed OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, >> expandedKey [1] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL >> } >> >> As opposed to the current definition at the end of section 5 of >> the draft: >> >> When used in a OneAsymmetricKey type, the privateKey OCTET >> STRING contains the raw octet string encoding of the 64-octet >> seed. >> >> If the IETF Working Group decides to output {SEED}-only and not >> support {SEED + KEY} or {KEY}-only, it would interoperate on input >> with OpenSSL and Bouncy Castle, provided the seed is preceded by >> exactly four bytes of ASN.1 encapsulation. In hexadecimal, these >> are: 30420440, indicating a sequence of length 66 enclosing an >> OCTET STRING of length 64. The additional four bytes cannot >> reasonably be argued to be overly burdensome to produce on output, >> or to match and discard on input. Of course if that is the only >> selected option, interoperability will suffer as the specification >> would be unable to represent {SEED + KEY} or {KEY} alone. >> >> OpenSSL Statement: >> >> We have working code that can accept all three input variants >> and generate all three output variants proposed. We also >> accept the existing oqs_provider ASN.1 encoded variants but we >> don’t expect that others will do the same. The reworked code >> is cleaner and clearer than our code based on length >> heuristics and processes the ASN.1 encapsulation using a very >> simple table-driven parser, without resort to our >> general-purpose ASN.1 parser (this demonstrates how simple the >> proposed format is to encode and decode). >> >> Bouncy Castle Statement: >> >> We have working code that can accept both the proposal >> detailed here and the {SEED}-only proposal. For output we will >> attempt to echo the original encoding, although, particularly >> for the case of ML-KEM, it has become obvious that we need to >> follow the proposal here (for the sake of our user >> community), as import of keys for the {SEED}-only case may be >> impossible for other FIPS providers where the direct >> processing of encodings is outside of the FIPS boundary. We >> will attempt to migrate {KEY}-only users to the proposal here, >> which will (hopefully) limit us to just {SEED}, or the {SEED + >> KEY} SEQUENCE. >> >> Authors and Contributors: >> >> Viktor Dukhovni (OpenSSL) >> Dmitry Belyavskiy (RedHat, OpenSSL maintainer) >> Matt Caswell (OpenSSL Foundation President) >> David Hook (Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc, >> co-founder and maintainer) >> Tim Hudson (OpenSSL Corporation President, Cryptsoft CTO, >> OASIS Open PKCS#11 Profiles Co-Editor, >> OASIS Open KMIP Profiles Co-Editor, >> Formal liaison between the OASIS Open PKCS#11 and KMIP >> Technical Committees) >> Bob Relyea (RedHat, NSS developer, >> OASIS Open PKCS #11 Co-chair) >> Simo Sorce (RedHat, OASIS Open PKCS #11 member) >> >> -- >> Viktor. >> >> A formatted copy of this note can be found at: >> >> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://openssl-corporation.org/files/blog/Request_to_Extend_IETF_WGLC_for_PQ_Key_Specifications.pdf__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIBEb2YB0$ <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/openssl-corporation.org/files/blog/Request_to_Extend_IETF_WGLC_for_PQ_Key_Specifications.pdf__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIBEb2YB0$> >> >> A work-in-progress snapshot of of a proposed revision of the draft >> specification ML-KEM can be temporarily found at: >> >> https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://vdukhovni.github.io/ml-kem-certificates/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIJ0bC2WY$ <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/vdukhovni.github.io/ml-kem-certificates/__;!!FJ-Y8qCqXTj2!avCS6r7jO9L8aX0ISmtjdhxbP8mLK636QEqyu_zBRimQNee5giUBwHb-JPS4HOTf9Dh6ZVamxjxu6WVIJ0bC2WY$> >> >> similar changes would be needed ml-dsa. > > _______________________________________________ > Spasm mailing list -- spasm@ietf.org <mailto:spasm@ietf.org> > To unsubscribe send an email to spasm-leave@ietf.org <mailto:spasm-leave@ietf.org> _______________________________________________ Spasm mailing list -- spasm@ietf.org <mailto:spasm@ietf.org> To unsubscribe send an email to spasm-leave@ietf.org <mailto:spasm-leave@ietf.org>
- [lamps] Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KEM an… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… John Gray
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Michael Richardson
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Sean Turner
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Daniel Van Geest
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Sean Turner
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Carl Wallace
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Sean Turner
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Carl Wallace
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to E… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Dmitry Belyavskiy
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Request to Extend IETF WGL… Alicja Kario
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Request to Extend IETF WGL… Alicja Kario
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Michael StJohns
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Peter Gutmann
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… StJohns, Michael
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Michael Richardson
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Michael StJohns
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Michael Richardson
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Carl Wallace
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Deirdre Connolly
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Request to Extend IETF WGL… Alicja Kario
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Michael Richardson
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to E… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… David Benjamin
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Mike Ounsworth
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… David Benjamin
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Daniel Van Geest
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Request to Extend IETF… Falko Strenzke
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Jean-Pierre Fiset
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Bas Westerbaan
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Bas Westerbaan
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… D. J. Bernstein
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… D. J. Bernstein
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Jean-Pierre Fiset
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Falko Strenzke
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Sean Turner
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Wei-Jun Wang
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Wei-Jun Wang
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Russ Housley
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Wei-Jun Wang
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Ilari Liusvaara
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Kampanakis, Panos
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Simo Sorce
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Michael Richardson
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Benjamin
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… John Kemp
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Simo Sorce
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Simo Sorce
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Benjamin
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Simo Sorce
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Simo Sorce
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Robert Relyea
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Damien Miller
- [lamps] Re: [EXT] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC… Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… D. J. Bernstein
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… John Mattsson
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Sophie Schmieg
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Damien Miller
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Tim Hudson
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Watson Ladd
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Salz, Rich
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… David Hook
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Damien Miller
- [lamps] Re: Request to Extend IETF WGLC for ML-KE… Viktor Dukhovni