Re: [spring] [IPv6] Requiring Tunneling - subject change

"Martin Vigoureux (Nokia)" <martin.vigoureux@nokia.com> Thu, 28 March 2024 15:58 UTC

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Subject: Re: [spring] [IPv6] Requiring Tunneling - subject change
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Hi Joel,


Le 2024-03-28 à 16:46, Joel Halpern a écrit :
> 	
> CAUTION:This is an external email. Please be very careful when clicking 
> links or opening attachments. See the URL nok.it/ext for additional 
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> 
> Robert, as far as I can tell, you are asking for a different change than 
> any of the other proposals.  If I understand, you are proposing that 
> even end hosts inside an SRv6 domain should encapsulate the underlying 
> IPv6 packet.  In order to help the chairs keep track, and tell if there 
> are other folks who also support such a change, I have changed the 
> subject line and ask that if there is more to say, people use this 
> subject line.
> 
> I look forward to comments from folks beyond Tom and Robert on this subject.

before talking about a potential solution, could you confirm that the 
issue is about respecting a convention?

regards
-m

> 
> Yours,
> 
> Joel M. Halpern
> 
> On 3/28/2024 11:40 AM, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>> Hi Tom,
>>
>> Not really.
>>
>> RFC8200 defines an exception which is tunneling and says:
>>           As an exception to the default behavior, protocols that use UDP
>>           as a tunnel encapsulation may enable zero-checksum mode for a
>>           specific port (or set of ports) for sending and/or receiving.
>>           Any node implementing zero-checksum mode must follow the
>>           requirements specified in "Applicability Statement for the Use
>>           of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [RFC6936  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6936>].
>>
>> So in practice if we always tunnel SRv6 there is no issue.
>>
>> Even Andrew agreed with that :)
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Robert
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 4:36 PM Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> wrote:
>>
>>     On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 7:46 AM Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
>>     wrote:
>>     >
>>     > Hi Tom,
>>     >
>>     > > because of SRH
>>     >
>>     > Ok I buy this that there are devices which do check checksum and
>>     are not final destination of the packets  ... I was more talking
>>     about plain forwarding devices (aka P routers). Then I doubt
>>     firewalls would be sitting in the core of the networks.
>>     >
>>     > But let me come black to what I believe is the main disconnect.
>>     >
>>     > Why SRH would cause an issue ? I think there is claimed issue
>>     *ONLY* with SRv6 packets which are not encapsulated - call it raw
>>     - sent by the hosts which talk SRv6 and sent with more then one
>>     SID/uSID which may get swapped on the way.
>>     >
>>     > Because only in those cases the destination address will be
>>     changing while checksum of the tunnel header will not be zero.
>>     >
>>     > So what we should I think discuss are really B.1 and B.2.2 cases.
>>
>>     Robert,
>>
>>     The scenario that I'm talking about is really simple, and it's not
>>     specific to segment routing.  If someone sends a TCP in an IPv6 packet
>>     with no routing header then the convention is that the TCP checksum is
>>     valid end to end. So if the addresses are changed in flight, like in
>>     NAT, then we expect that some part of the packet covered by the
>>     checksum is adjusted to offset the change. If a packet is sent in
>>     segment routing without an SRH with EtherType 0x86DD then it IS an
>>     IPv6 packet to the network so all the conventions and requirements of
>>     IPv6 should be applied. IMO, if SRv6 can't maintain these conventions
>>     and requirements then it should fork from IPv6 and use a different
>>     EtherType.
>>
>>     Tom
>>
>>     >
>>     > Francois, Pablo - could you comment on this how often do we see
>>     those type of SRv6 deployments ? And also could you comment if
>>     operator who enables SRv6 in the first place sees those checksum
>>     errors how difficult is to address it ?
>>     >
>>     > Thx,
>>     > Robert
>>     >
>>     >
>>     > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 3:29 PM Tom Herbert
>>     <tom@herbertland.com> wrote:
>>     >>
>>     >> On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 6:26 AM Robert Raszuk
>>     <robert@raszuk.net> wrote:
>>     >> >
>>     >> > Hi Alvaro,
>>     >> >
>>     >> > On this specific topic I think you have flatted it a bit too
>>     much.
>>     >> >
>>     >> > These are apparently the options on the table:
>>     >> >
>>     >> > A) Original packet get's encapsulated with IPv6 header
>>     >> >
>>     >> >       A.1 SHR is added to it
>>     >> >
>>     >> >              A.1.1. Regular SIDs are used
>>     >> >              A.1.2  Compresses SIDs are used
>>     >> >
>>     >> >       A.2 SRH is not added to it
>>     >> >
>>     >> >              A.2.1. Regular SID is used as destination
>>     >> >              A.2.2  Compresses SIDs are used in a container
>>     >> >              A.2.3  Compresses SID is used
>>     >> >
>>     >> > B) Original packet get's send from SRv6 host (without
>>     encapsulation)
>>     >> >
>>     >> >     B.1 SHR is added to it
>>     >> >
>>     >> >              B.1.1. Regular SIDs are used
>>     >> >              B.1.2  Compresses SIDs are used
>>     >> >
>>     >> >       B.2 SRH is not added to it
>>     >> >
>>     >> >              B.2.1. Regular SID is used as destination
>>     >> >              B.2.2  Compresses SIDs are used in a container
>>     >> >              B.2.3  Compresses SID is used
>>     >> >
>>     >> > So within all checksum related discussions so far it seems
>>     that the only concern is about B.2.2 and perhaps B.1 however folks
>>     did state that if there is SRH added there is no issue so I am not
>>     sure how the presence of SRH fixes it.
>>     >> >
>>     >> > Maybe there was some assumption that presence of SRH mandates
>>     encapsulation, but I do not believe this is the case for native
>>     SRv6 hosts.
>>     >> >
>>     >> > All in all I think it should be no business for transit nodes
>>     to verify packet's upper layer checksum. I do not know if there is
>>     any RFC which would describe what is an expected behavior for
>>     transit nodes or even say that they MAY do it.
>>     >>
>>     >> Robert,
>>     >>
>>     >> I can go further than that. I believe that intermediate nodes
>>     have no
>>     >> business parsing into the transport layer, and yet firewalls do
>>     that
>>     >> all the time even though there is no standard RFC on it (I've asked
>>     >> for someone to formalize the requirements of firewalls, but to no
>>     >> avail). Validating the checksum in flight is an instance of
>>     this, and
>>     >> there are devices that commonly do this in deployment. Protocol
>>     >> specific checksum offload in NICs is one example. Also, if
>>     someone is
>>     >> seeing checksum failures in their network, an obvious action is to
>>     >> sample packets from routers in the path and look at the traces.
>>     If the
>>     >> checksum is incorrect on the wire because of SRH then the operator
>>     >> sees a whole bunch of checksum errors at the router, but has no
>>     way to
>>     >> distinguish those packets that are actually good from those
>>     that are
>>     >> bad.
>>     >>
>>     >> It's a long established convention in IP that the transport
>>     checksum
>>     >> is maintained to be correct on the wire-- this is done in NAT by
>>     >> adjusting the checksum directly, there's also checksum neutral NAT
>>     >> that adjusts another part of the IPv6 header to keep the transport
>>     >> layer checksum correct. IMO, deviating from this convention is
>>     risky,
>>     >> not just to SRH packets but that can have collateral damage like
>>     >> breaking the user's ability to debug bad links as I described
>>     above.
>>     >>
>>     >> Tom
>>     >>
>>     >> >
>>     >> > Kind regards,
>>     >> > Robert
>>     >> >
>>     >> >
>>     >> >
>>     >> > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 1:06 PM Alvaro Retana
>>     <aretana.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>     >> >>
>>     >> >> Focusing on the C-SID draft, some have suggested requiring the
>>     >> >> presence of the SRH whenever C-SIDs are used. Please discuss
>>     whether
>>     >> >> that is the desired behavior (or not) -- please be specific when
>>     >> >> debating the benefits or consequences of either behavior.
>>     >> >>
>>     >> >> Please keep the related (but independent) discussion of
>>     requiring the
>>     >> >> SRH whenever SRv6 is used separate. This larger topic may impact
>>     >> >> several documents and is better handled in a different
>>     thread (with
>>     >> >> 6man and spring included).
>>     >> >>
>>     >> >> Thanks!
>>     >> >>
>>     >> >> Alvaro
>>     >> >> -- for spring-chairs
>>     >> >>
>>     >> >>
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