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Re: [stir] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226-03: (with COMMENT)

Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com> Sun, 27 June 2021 18:04 UTC

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From: Erik Kline <ek.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 27 Jun 2021 11:03:58 -0700
Message-ID: <CAMGpriV5gCG4tW8HtfksAZjQ5JzRP-JyLjxy-pwdeuQc8dCpzA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
Cc: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, IETF STIR Mail List <stir@ietf.org>, Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>, Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [stir] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-stir-enhance-rfc8226-03: (with COMMENT)
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On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 10:07 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> wrote:

>
> Erik:
>
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > [S4] [comment]
> >
> > * Given the example in section 5, it seems that mustInclude can be used
> >  in conjunction with permittedValues.
> >
> >  Perhaps amend the last sentence of the 2nd example to indicate this?
> >
> >  "However, a verification service will not treat as invalid a PASSporT
> >  it receives without a PASSporT "confidence" claim at all (unless also
> >  appearing in a mustInclude claim)."
> >
> >  or something...
>
> Sure, we can be more explicit about that case.  How about:
>
>    *  If a CA issues a certificate to an authentication service that
>       includes an Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension
>       that contains the permittedValues JWTClaimName "confidence" and a
>       permitted "high" value, then a verification service will treat as
>       invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT "confidence"
>       claim with a value other than "high".  However, a verification
>       service will not treat as invalid a PASSporT it receives without a
>       PASSporT "confidence" claim at all, unless "confidence" also
>       appears in mustInclude.
>

Sounds perfect; thanks!

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