[stir] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-stir-passport-divert-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Benjamin Kaduk has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-stir-passport-divert-08: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I support Roman's Discuss.  Isn't there a straightforward translation of
the "div" procedures to the nested "div-o" chain?  Why would that not be
applicable?

I had two other points for discussion:

(1) IANA seems unhappy (the expert review identified issues).  What's the
plan to address them?

(2) The following text from the Security Considerations seems inconsistent
to me:

                                                          However,
   including this information about forwarding is at the discretion of
   the retargeting entity, so if there is a requirement to keep the
   original called number confidential, no PASSporT should be created
   for that retargeting - the only consequence will be that downstream
   entities will be unable to correlate an incoming call with the
   original PASSporT without access to some prior knowledge of the
   policies that could have caused the retargeting.

I don't understand this -- if the idea is to keep the original called
number confidential, wouldn't this necessitate *not giving the original
PASSporT to the called entity*, since the original PASSporT includes the
original call destination?  Without the original PASSporT at all, of
course it can't be correlated to an incoming call...  (Even in the OOB
case, would the post-retargeting called entity even be able to
retrieve/decrypt the original PASSporT?)  Is this intended to only apply
to some non-SIP case?


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COMMENT:
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While it looks like the main change in the -08 is intended to address
the secdir reviewer's comment, it would be nice to respond to the review
and mention the new text.

Do we need to say something about whitespace being added to examples for
readability?

Section 1

Is there an intended mnemonic for the "opt" element?  ("Original
passport"?)

Do "div-o" PASSporTs necessarily carry both "div" and "opt", or is "opt"
intended to be able to stand alone in a "div-o" PASSporT?

Section 3

   canonical form of the "dest" identifiier is not changed during

nit: s/identifiier/identifier/

   A "div" PASSporT claims set is populated with elements drawn from the
   PASSporT(s) received for a call by the retargeting entity: at a high

When would there be multiple received PASSporTs that all are input to
the same "div" PASSporT?
Also, the later discussion that indicates only a small number of
claims/extensions are copied from the original PASSporT (and that "iat"
might change!) suggests that perhaps the "is populated with" language
could be tweaked.

   level, the original identifier for the called party in the "dest"
   object will become the "div" claim in the new PASSporT.  If the

This "will become" language seems a bit problematic when combined with
the definition in Section 8 of an "hi" element within the "div" claim,
which is not part of the "original identifier for the called party".

   The combined full form PASSporT (with a signature covered by the
   ES256 keys given in Appendix A) would look as follows:

    eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInBwdCI6ImRpdiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1Ij \
    oiaHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vY2VydC5jZXIifQ.eyJkZXN0Ijp7InRuI \
    jpbIjEyMTU1NTUxMjE0Il19LCJkaXYiOnsidG4iOiIxMjE1NTU1NTEyMTMifSwiaWF \
    0IjoxNDQzMjA4MzQ1LCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0.xBHWipDEE \
    J8a6TsdX6xUXAnblsFiGUiAxwLiv0HLC9IICj6eG9jQd6WzeSSjHRBwxmChHhVIiMT \
    SqIlk3yCNkg

(The decoded claims set is sorted, though the previous display-form
example was in a different order.)

Section 4

   This section specifies SIP-specific usage for the "div" PASSporT type
   and its handling in the SIP Identity header field "ppt" parameter
   value.  Other protocols using PASSporT may define behavior specific
   to their use of the "div" claim.

Is the last line supposed to be "claim" or "PASSporT type"?

Section 4.1

   The retargeting entity SHOULD act as a verification service and
   validate the existing Identity header field value(s) in the request
   before proceeding; in some high-volume environments, it may instead
   put that burden of validating the chain entirely on the terminating
   verification service.  As the authentication service will be adding a

Is this intended to be the only allowed exception to the SHOULD?  (Can
we phrase it as a MUST instead, e.g., "except when it is know that the
terminating verification service will do so, the retargeting entity MUST
act as a verification service"?)

   PASSporT.  Note that this effectively creates multiple chains of
   "div" PASSporTs in a single request, which complicates the procedures
   that need to be performed at verification services.

[ponders whether there should be more security considerations about
these added complications]

   not for "div" PASSporTs with earlier targets.  Ordinarily, the
   current target will be readily identifiable, as it will be in the
   last "div" PASSporT in each chain, and in SIP cases it will
   correspond to the Request-URI received by the retargeting entity.
   Moreover, the current target will be an identifier that the
   retargeting entity possess a credential to sign for, which may not be
   true for earlier targets.  Ultimately, on each retargeting, the
   number of PASSporTs added to a request will be equal to the number of
   non-"div" PASSporTs that do not share the same "orig" and "dest"
   object values.

We seem to be providing two or three descriptions of the number of new
"div" PASSporTs to be created, and it's hard to have full confidence
that all are guaranteed to produce identical results.  Is it possible to
clarify a single definitive procedure?

Section 4.2

   In order to validate a SIP request using the "div" PASSporT type, a
   verification service needs to inspect all of the valid Identity
   header field values associated with a request, as an Identity header
   field value containing "div" necessarily refers to an earlier
   PASSporT already in the message.  [...]

(refers to one or more earlier PASSporT, no?)

                                                    Deployments that
   change the original To header field value to conceal the original
   destination of the call from the ultimate recipient should note that
   the original destination of a call may be preserved in the innermost
   PASSporT.  [...]

Should this also be noted in the security considerations?

Section 5

   This specification defines a "div-o" PASSporT type that uses the
   "div" claim element in conjunction with the opt (Section 6) PASSporT
   claim element.  As is the case with "div" PASSporT type, a "div-o"

nit: any reason why we refer to "div" as a "claim element" but "opt"
(with no quotes!) as a "PASSporT claim element"?

Section 6

   The presence of an original PASSporT claims set element, designated
   as "opt", signifies that a PASSporT encapsulates another entire
   PASSporT within it, typically a PASSporT that was transformed in some
   way to create the current PASSporT.  Relying parties may need to
   consult the encapsulated PASSporT in order to validate the identity
   of a caller. "opt" as defined in this specification may be used by
   future PASSporT extensions as well as in conjunction with "div-o".

All the more reason for this document to specify the "div-o" usage's
validation procedures!

Section 7

   an impractical number of combinations.  But in very complex call
   routing scenarios, attestation of source identity would only add
   limited value anyway.

I'm not sure what point this last sentence is trying to make.  "Yes this
is complicated, but no one would do it anyway"?  That doesn't really
support the case for retargeting over redirecting...

   STIR-aware SIP intermediaries that redirect requests MAY therefore
   convey one or more PASSporTs in the backwards direction within
   Identity header fields.  These redirecting entities will act as
   authentication services for "div" as described in Section 4.1.  This
   document consequently updates [RFC8224] to permit carrying Identity
   header fields in SIP 300-class responses.  It is left to the
   originating user agent to determine which Identity header fields
   should be copied from the 3xx into any new requests resulting from
   the redirection, if any: use of these Identity header fields by
   entities receiving a 3xx response is OPTIONAL.

Is the idea that making this use optional obviates any need for a
negotiation mechanism where the originating user agent indicates support
for receiving PASSporTs in the 300-class response?

Section 10.1.2

   Claim Description: Encapsulated JSON token

Is it an encapsulated "JSON token" or "PASSporT [JSON Web Token]"?

Section 11

   However, as there may be unforeseen circumstances where the
   revelation of service logic to the called party poses a privacy risk,
   implementers and users of this or similar diversion-tracking
   techniques should understand the trade-off.

Don't the 300-class redirections also involve some revelation of
information to the calling party?  I think that could be worth
mentioning (though it's not specific to the PASSporT case).

   Furthermore, it is a general privacy risk of identity mechanisms
   overall that they do not interface well with anonymization services;
   the interaction of STIR with anonymization services is detailed in
   [RFC8224] Section 11.  Any forwarding services that acts as an
   anonymizing proxy may not be able to provide a secure chain of
   retargeting due to the obfuscation of the originating identity.

Isn't there also a risk that an anonymizing proxy might not know to
remove all the (information contained in the) PASSporTs, thus
inadvertently leaking identity information?

Section 12

   risk arises at the discretion of the retargeting domain: simply using
   3xx response redirections rather than retargeting (with supply a
   "div" per Section 7) mitigates the potential impact.  Under unusual

nit: grammar is weird around "with supply a 'div'"

Appendix A

Thanks for including the keys needed to validate the examples!
(Alas, I don't have a JWT or JOSE library handy, so I didn't do so...)