[Strint-attendees] Do we need a breakthrough in key management first?
Johan Pouwelse <peer2peer@gmail.com> Sun, 23 February 2014 19:11 UTC
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Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 20:11:44 +0100
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From: Johan Pouwelse <peer2peer@gmail.com>
To: strint-attendees@lists.i1b.org, "Carlo v. Loesch" <lynX@we.were.webeteer.pages.de>
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Subject: [Strint-attendees] Do we need a breakthrough in key management first?
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On 17 February 2014 11:31, Carlo v. Loesch <lynX@we.were.webeteer.pages.de> wrote: > And there are some papers, that propose fundamental > rethinking of the way we run the Internet. Some are > just rough ideas (26, 38) while others appear to have [snip] > 65: The Internet is Broken: Building a GNU Network > > Alas, I am biased. This is the paper I contributed to. > For several years we have been working on design and > implementation of an alternative Internet. Although it > currently runs as an overlay network, it has developed > protocols to replace DNS, X.509, BGP and various other > insecure technologies. DHT-based cryptographic routing > has matured in over a decade and grown well out of its > infancy (just watch Tor). Why stick to horse carriages > if there is a car waiting outside? Key management seems to me the key problem that needs a breakthrough and re-thinking. How far can we travel without crossing that bridge? But what does a solution look like. DHT-based overlays? As an academic I think that the most promising direction is a fully distributed key directory and reputation system. Taking the idea of the "the people's CA" even further. Everybody issues certificates in public and private. End-users themselves store all data (so no DHT needed) and successful user-to-user interactions feed into it. We have Internet-deployed code within this direction. It combines parts of the Tor specs with reputations and removal of all central components/servers. The aim is called the "Shadow Internet", see fresh I-D: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-pouwelse-perpass-shadow-internet/ For the past decade my university research team has worked on this. We obtained 1.4 million installs, mainly due to the Bittorrent-backwards compability. We now have implemented the Tor tunnel specification. Technical documentation: https://github.com/Tribler/tribler/wiki Looking forward to discussion "alternative Internet" matters with you at STRINT. (my whitepaper was too late, sorry, became the above 19-page IETF draft) Greetings, johan.
- Re: [Strint-attendees] Do we need a breakthrough … Christian Grothoff
- Re: [Strint-attendees] Do we need a breakthrough … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Strint-attendees] Do we need a breakthrough in k… Johan Pouwelse