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Re: [sunset4] to summarize Lorzeno's "drive-by" attack on draft-ietf-sunset4-noipv4

Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com> Mon, 28 July 2014 16:26 UTC

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From: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 09:26:16 -0700
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References: <11190.1406240244@sandelman.ca> <C12A07EA-E27A-4EAF-A9DE-536FF22A0395@cisco.com> <3B647D53-0E22-43C3-892D-319C9109248C@nominum.com> <53D6559B.2090300@jive.com> <C38ED5E4-5088-4877-9A9F-160EAFCA9938@nominum.com>
To: Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com>
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Cc: Simon Perreault <sperreault@jive.com>, sunset4@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sunset4] to summarize Lorzeno's "drive-by" attack on draft-ietf-sunset4-noipv4
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On Jul 28, 2014, at 7:30 AM, Ted Lemon <Ted.Lemon@nominum.com> wrote:

> On Jul 28, 2014, at 9:52 AM, Simon Perreault <sperreault@jive.com> wrote:
>> Dan didn't say "broken", he said "attacker-controlled", possibly (my guess) thinking of the infamous "SLAAC attack" [*]. Happy eyeballs is useless here.
> 
> This is the MiTM attack I referred to in the previous message.   If you are not using secure protocols, you are always vulnerable to MiTM.

Considering RA Guard (RFC6105) and DHCP guard are necessary, so I don't see draft-ietf-sunset4-noipv4 creating a *new* risk.

I agree improving security of RA and DHCP (e.g., draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6) are helpful, but in the intervening days between today and ubiquitous availability of deployable and secure RA and DHCP, a responsible network needs to block spoofed router advertisements from non-routers and prevent DHCP spoofing from non-DHCP servers.

Simon bought up an interesting point that an attacker abusing NOIPV4 needs only send a few packets and would have a lasting impact.  The attacker need not stay on the network to have a lasting impact.

-d

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