[Syslog] lower requirements? (Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls-12.txt)

Martin Schütte <lists@mschuette.name> Sat, 10 May 2008 15:54 UTC

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Date: Sat, 10 May 2008 17:33:23 +0000
From: Martin Schütte <lists@mschuette.name>
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Subject: [Syslog] lower requirements? (Re: I-D Action:draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls-12.txt)
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>    The transport sender (TLS client) has three different options for
>    authenticating and authorizing the transport receiver (TLS server).

I do not know if this has been discussed previously, but what is your 
opinion on lower requirements in order to get transport-tls supported by 
embedded devices, i.e. switches and printers?

Scenario:
I could imagine a printer (as the client) having a self-signed 
certificate and no ability to authenticate the server's certificate.
As long as the server has a copy of the client's certificate and can 
verify it, a secure transport is possible. As an admin I would rather 
configure this one-way authentication and get a TLS-enabled device than 
having to fall back to UDP.
Should this be an allowed scenario to be covered by tls-transport?

Scenario2:
Say the same printer with its self-signed cert is configurable with a 
CA-cert that enables it to authenticate the server (but maybe without 
checking the certificate's CN/dNSName/IP).
That would allow a reasonably secure setup. -- Should this be an allowed 
scenario to be covered by tls-transport?
In my opinion it should be, thus I would like to keep the requirements 
on authentication rules as simple as possible.

-- 
Martin
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