Re: [Syslog] New Version: draft-ietf-syslog-dtls-02

[Richard Graveman <[e-mail]>]

> I've looked over these changes and feel that they address the WGLC comments
> that were received.  I'd appreciate it if the people who did the reviews
> would also do a check.

Requiring certificates is a lot of extra baggage for worsened
security. All the commonly encountered certificates today are based on
signatures of weak hash functions, primarily SHA-1. Cipher suites
like:

0x00,0xA8     TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256          [RFC5487]
0x00,0xA9     TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384          [RFC5487]

do not suffer from the twin disease of weak and inefficient security
and ought to be an option, as Tschonfig and Eronen say in 4279:

      ... pre-shared keys may be more convenient from a key
      management point of view.  For instance, in closed environments
      where the connections are mostly configured manually in advance,
      it may be easier to configure a PSK than to use certificates.
      Another case is when the parties already have a mechanism for
      setting up a shared secret key, and that mechanism could be used
      to "bootstrap" a key for authenticating a TLS connection.

This is precisely the environment is which I would expect to find a
lot of syslog, as opposed to "TLS on the Web."

Rich Graveman