Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tls-option-04
David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Fri, 23 October 2015 02:49 UTC
Return-Path: <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
X-Original-To: tcpinc@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tcpinc@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8A18D1B3137 for <tcpinc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:49:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -0.61
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.61 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, HK_RANDOM_ENVFROM=0.001, HK_RANDOM_FROM=1, MIME_8BIT_HEADER=0.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KS3h1G9fRPJQ for <tcpinc@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:49:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from market.scs.stanford.edu (www.scs.stanford.edu [IPv6:2001:470:806d:1::9]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D08F11B3136 for <tcpinc@ietf.org>; Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:49:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from market.scs.stanford.edu (localhost.scs.stanford.edu [127.0.0.1]) by market.scs.stanford.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id t9N2nYC9015871; Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:49:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: (from dm@localhost) by market.scs.stanford.edu (8.14.7/8.14.7/Submit) id t9N2nXf6017800; Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:49:33 -0700 (PDT)
X-Authentication-Warning: market.scs.stanford.edu: dm set sender to dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu using -f
From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBPMRN4BA46dGQMyNcdZbMhQ7OoughcoT7zMDac79KdfDw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <07616023-76C2-4418-BCCC-47B40391DC5D@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <CABcZeBOT0k0eAQ--+=BG9dEg-irwaQiP+d8JiaAPwmK6Mogt7w@mail.gmail.com> <5627B7CF.6080505@tik.ee.ethz.ch> <CABcZeBPMRN4BA46dGQMyNcdZbMhQ7OoughcoT7zMDac79KdfDw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 19:49:33 -0700
Message-ID: <87d1w6b8oy.fsf@ta.scs.stanford.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tcpinc/TCPydVPrxjL7PQhqpX3Q9GBF23M>
Cc: tcpinc <tcpinc@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tls-option-04
X-BeenThere: tcpinc@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
Reply-To: David Mazieres expires 2016-01-20 PST <mazieres-xdr8pv9v64xa8gqvps3ymmd4te@temporary-address.scs.stanford.edu>
List-Id: "Discussion list for adding encryption to TCP." <tcpinc.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tcpinc>, <mailto:tcpinc-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tcpinc/>
List-Post: <mailto:tcpinc@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tcpinc-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc>, <mailto:tcpinc-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 02:49:35 -0000
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> writes: > I don't think this follows at all. The charter doesn't say anything > about kernel implementations. It says "The protocol must be usable by > unmodified applications"... > Another concrete scenario (which is attractive for a TLS > implementation) is to use a minimal kernel component (or a divert > socket) to do the ENO options with a modified libc to actually do the > TLS negotiation and data handling. This would also provide > system-wide support but would not be in the kernel. I don't see > anything in the charter which prohibits this. The libc implementation won't work with unmodified applications, because it will break when sharing/passing/inheriting file descriptors across processes, a common pattern for Unix servers. It will probably be best to take a two-pronged strategy, where a rock-solid user-level daemon implementation gets us deployment in places where people want to secure network storage protocols, database connections, etc. But then that adoption creates pressure to upstream the kernel implementation. My experience from tcpcrypt is that cloud providers are interested in the functionality but very skittish about any kernel mods. David
- [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tl… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… David Mazieres
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpin… David Mazieres