Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tls-option-04

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Fri, 23 October 2015 04:30 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2015 21:30:03 -0700
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To: David Mazieres expires 2016-01-20 PST <mazieres-xdr8pv9v64xa8gqvps3ymmd4te@temporary-address.scs.stanford.edu>
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Cc: tcpinc <tcpinc@ietf.org>, Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Quick review of draft-rescorla-tcpinc-tls-option-04
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On Thu, Oct 22, 2015 at 7:49 PM, David Mazieres <
dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> wrote:

> Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> writes:
>
> > I don't think this follows at all. The charter doesn't say anything
> > about kernel implementations. It says "The protocol must be usable by
> > unmodified applications"...
>
> > Another concrete scenario (which is attractive for a TLS
> > implementation) is to use a minimal kernel component (or a divert
> > socket) to do the ENO options with a modified libc to actually do the
> > TLS negotiation and data handling.  This would also provide
> > system-wide support but would not be in the kernel.  I don't see
> > anything in the charter which prohibits this.
>
> The libc implementation won't work with unmodified applications, because
> it will break when sharing/passing/inheriting file descriptors across
> processes, a common pattern for Unix servers.
>

Hmm... I've seen designs where this should work, for instance where
you dup the fds to point them to some intermediate location.

-Ekr




> It will probably be best to take a two-pronged strategy, where a
> rock-solid user-level daemon implementation gets us deployment in places
> where people want to secure network storage protocols, database
> connections, etc.  But then that adoption creates pressure to upstream
> the kernel implementation.  My experience from tcpcrypt is that cloud
> providers are interested in the functionality but very skittish about
> any kernel mods.
>
> David
>