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Re: [tcpinc] Revised version of TCP-ENO

David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> Thu, 13 August 2015 22:22 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu>
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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 15:22:53 -0700
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Subject: Re: [tcpinc] Revised version of TCP-ENO
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David Mazieres <dm-list-tcpcrypt@scs.stanford.edu> writes:

>     * Specs should assume the session ID will be made public and ensure
>       that it contains no confidential data (such as data permitting the
>       derivation of session keys).
>
>     * However, unless the application at either end of a connection
>       takes steps to disclose the session ID, specs should ensure that a
>       network eavesdropper has a negligible advantage in differentiating
>       the collision-resistant hash in a session ID from uniform random
>       bytes.

Just wordsmithing a bit, I now propose:

* Unless and until applications disclose information about the session
  ID, all but the first byte MUST be computationally indistinguishable
  from random bytes to a network eavesdropper.

* Applications MAY chose to make session IDs public.  Therefore, specs
  MUST NOT place any confidential data in the session ID (such as data
  permitting the derivation of session keys).

David

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