Re: [tcpm] [tcpinc] TCP Stealth - possible interest to the WG

Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu> Thu, 21 August 2014 17:03 UTC

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Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 10:01:47 -0700
From: Joe Touch <touch@isi.edu>
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To: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>, "Scheffenegger, Richard" <rs@netapp.com>, "alfiej@fastmail.fm" <alfiej@fastmail.fm>, Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>
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Subject: Re: [tcpm] [tcpinc] TCP Stealth - possible interest to the WG
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On 8/21/2014 9:22 AM, Christian Grothoff wrote:
> On 08/21/14 06:16, Joe Touch wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 8/18/2014 3:07 PM, Scheffenegger, Richard wrote:
>>> Hi Alfie,
>>>
>>> my concern is with the use of a static ISN for each 4-tuple; this
>>> significantly increases the chance of a collision between sessions (ie.
>>> when the sender terminates a sluggish earlier session, some segments of
>>> that last session will very likely be in-window for a session that was
>>> started a short time later).
>>
>> +1, and I haven't seen a satisfactory answer to this yet.
>>
>> FWIW, the doc refers to TCP MD5, which has been deprecated and replaced
>> by TCP-AO. TCP-AO has an experimental extension to support NAT traversal.
>
> Well, several people seem to suggest that making the use of TSval
> _mandatory_ with TCP Stealth would solve this and other concerns; so if
> we put that into the draft, would you be happy?

You still have the ISN validity to deal with. TSval helps differentiate 
wrap - i.e., first use of a sequence number space vs. future use. Your 
ISN calculation could easily generate an ISN that's valid for the TSval 
used.

>> Additionally, responding with a TCP RST isn't the best response if
>> you're trying to hide from port knocking. Silence is best in that case.
>
> That depends on what the system does for a closed port.

No, it depends on what the system does for a port for which no process 
is listening. CLOSED is a TCP state. RST says something is listening on 
the connection but doesn't want to talk to you given the SYN parameters 
you gave.

ICMP destination unreachable/port unreachable seems more what you're 
aiming for if you want to prevent someone from trying again.

Joe


   The draft says
> the system should react in the same way as it usually does, and usually
> MY servers respond with TCP RST if the port is closed. If you usually
> drop, you should drop.  If this is about hiding, the key thing is to not
> change the behavior for the stealth-open port in relation to the
> behavior of a closed port.
>