RE: [tcpm] DoS attack from misbehaving receivers

Stephen Hemminger wrote:
> Has anyone in this group explored the problems described in:
> "Misbehaving TCP Receivers Can Cause Internet-Wide Congestion
> Collapse"? 
> 
> 	http://www.cs.umd.edu/~capveg/optack/optack-ccs05.pdf
> 	http://www.cs.umd.edu/~capveg/
> 	http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/102014
> 
> A possible solution (optack) is described in the paper that
> involves the sender randomly skipping segments and resetting
> connections that ACK data that was never sent.  But it is not
> clear that the impacts of such a change have been fully investigated.
> 
> Comments?
> 

The proposed test for a non-compliant receiver would seem to
require that the sender be non-compliant itself.

For many of the applications cited, wouldn't a more general
solution be to apply connection-specific rate limiters at
the sender (in the stack or at the application layer)?

Even if one client could truly receive at full line rate,
is is truly wise at the application layer to agree to give
all of your capacity to one client when hundreds or thousands
of clients are anticipated?

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