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Re: [therightkey] [dane] DANE and CT

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Fri, 16 November 2012 19:06 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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References: <CABrd9SRyv+UerPJBf+gw47nWj3t4ekHRnWsKC0pHcadHV5mvmw@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LSU.2.00.1211141601220.27013@hermes-1.csi.cam.ac.uk> <CABrd9SQ7mt_DSkVimrJ03K9suXEQzYSc_vZ3qUtGLCiphvRetQ@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LFD.2.02.1211141124490.4326@bofh.nohats.ca> <CABrd9SSv7vfxOhogGmYSWC8hROyXL_z4TJC8mxNMW-apSg5Y0Q@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LFD.2.02.1211151501490.17666@bofh.nohats.ca> <CABrd9SQPg+5CJk_Quv3J_kOedd+NeDc2aqregdcbWnZofjb8kg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
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Cc: therightkey@ietf.org, IETF DANE WG list <dane@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [therightkey] [dane] DANE and CT
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On Nov 16, 2012, at 3:23 AM, Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> wrote:

> As for CT vs DANE, it is precisely because DNS does not provide a
> robust infrastructure that DANE cannot be allowed to override CT. This
> can be fixed by making DANE use some kind of equivalently strong
> transparency. I agree with others that this is probably better applied
> to DS records than to TLSA records.

Proposal: we take this off the DANE list and keep it on therightkey list, focused on DS instead of DANE. That is, a rogue zone with additional / substitute DS records might affect more than DANE in the future.

--Paul Hoffman

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