Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction
Brad Lassey <lassey@google.com> Mon, 27 November 2023 22:10 UTC
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From: Brad Lassey <lassey@google.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 17:09:56 -0500
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To: Yogesh Karandikar <ykarandikar=40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se>, tigress@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction
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On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 5:04 PM Yogesh Karandikar <ykarandikar= 40apple.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote: > Replies inline. > > > Thanks, > Yogesh > > On Nov 27, 2023, at 10:35 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 9:01 AM Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se> wrote: > > > > Folks, > > The chairs have conferred and we recognize the following consensus: > > 1. assume that the invite channel is secure and adjust proposals > accordingly - at some point we need to identify what (if any) consensus > exists within the WG to pursue a solution > > I agree with this direction. > > > I thought the orthogonal option (#3) in the poll meant: > > 3.1 assume the invite channel can be *non-secure* and proceed with a > solution. > > 3.2 Orthogonal work to add security on top of a non-secure channel > (second-factor or other methods). > > > If we assume invite_channel to be secure (option #1 in the poll), I’m not > sure why orthogonal work would be required. > > > What's the meaning of secure here? I think based on what EKR and > others have said on the list this makes sense to pursue first as most > channels being proposed are secure in the relevant sense > > > In this context, secure == “invitation is delivered to only the recipient > selected by share initiator”. > > Hence non_secure would mean that someone else besides the selected > recipient has access to the invitation. > > > > 2. address invitation channels that are not fully secure in a way that > is orthogonal to the solutions the WG decides to pursue for the core > protocol. > > This, I suspect, would be a useful work item that could be pursued outside of this working group as it is generally applicable and I don't think is covered by our charter and I don't think it would be the best use of resources to narrowly tailor such a solution to the tigress use case. > > I suspect that orthogonality is tricky to actually achieve here. > > > Please respond with your support and/or disagreement. If you disagree > please provide whatever insights you are able to. > > Also please indicate your willingness to eventually implement and/or > support the results of (1) and (2). > > Best R > Leif & Prachi > > -- > Tigress mailing list > Tigress@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tigress > > > > > -- > Astra mortemque praestare gradatim > > -- > Tigress mailing list > Tigress@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tigress > > > -- > Tigress mailing list > Tigress@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tigress >
- [Tigress] post-118 direction Leif Johansson
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Prachi Jain
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Watson Ladd
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Yogesh Karandikar
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Brad Lassey
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Leif Johansson
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Prachi Jain
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Yogesh Karandikar
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Saxe, Dean
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Yogesh Karandikar
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction manuel.gerster
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction Crystal Qin