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Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction

Prachi Jain <prachi.jain1288@gmail.com> Thu, 30 November 2023 18:51 UTC

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From: Prachi Jain <prachi.jain1288@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 12:30:28 -0600
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To: Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, tigress@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Tigress] post-118 direction
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WG,
Chairs would like to hear from more of you. Please reply to this email with
any feedback you have.

-Prachi

On Wed, Nov 29, 2023 at 3:14 AM Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se> wrote:

> On Tue, 2023-11-28 at 20:27 -0800, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 23, 2023 at 6:01 AM Leif Johansson <leifj@sunet.se>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > Folks,
> > >
> > > The chairs have conferred and we recognize the following consensus:
> > >
> > > 1. assume that the invite channel is secure and adjust proposals
> > > accordingly - at some point we need to identify what (if any)
> > > consensus
> > > exists within the WG to pursue a solution
> > >
> >
> >
> > This seems fine. And I think we should identity that consensus sooner
> > rather than later.
> >
> >
> > > 2. address invitation channels that are not fully secure in a way
> > > that
> > > is orthogonal to the solutions the WG decides to pursue for the
> > > core
> > > protocol.
> > >
> >
> >
> > I don't understand what this means and I'm not sure that it will
> > work.
> > Depending on what assumptions you make about the system it may
> > or may not be possible to address this problem independently.
> >
>
> I am merely trying to reflect what was said in the room at 118.
>
> Several folks expressed an interest in trying to find mitigation for
> *some* situations where you want to use an invitation channel that
> doesn't fulfil security requirements.
>
> This I hope also answers Yogesh question: The assumption that the
> invitation channel is secure only means that if you want to use some
> channel that doesn't fulfil the security assumptions, you need to add
> protection either to the message layer or to the channel itself (eg
> adding TLS).
>
> Point (2) in our consensus summary just means that the chairs heard
> that some folks expressed an interest to work on certain solutions for
> adding security independently from the protocol itself. This may or may
> not be relevant work for TIGRESS.
>
>         Cheers Leif
>
> > -Ekr
> >
> >
> > >
> > > Please respond with your support and/or disagreement. If you
> > > disagree
> > > please provide whatever insights you are able to.
> > >
> > > Also please indicate your willingness to eventually implement
> > > and/or
> > > support the results of (1) and (2).
> > >
> > >         Best R
> > >         Leif & Prachi
> > >
>
> --
> Tigress mailing list
> Tigress@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tigress
>

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