Re: [Tls-reg-review] [IANA #1132414] Re: Request to register TLS integrity only cipher suites for TLS 1.3

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 10 December 2020 00:45 UTC

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Date: Wed, 09 Dec 2020 16:44:39 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: "iana-prot-param@iana.org" <iana-prot-param@iana.org>, "ncamwing@cisco.com" <ncamwing@cisco.com>, "tls-reg-review@ietf.org" <tls-reg-review@ietf.org>, "jmvisoky@ra.rockwell.com" <jmvisoky@ra.rockwell.com>
Message-ID: <20201210004439.GB64351@kduck.mit.edu>
References: <RT-Ticket-1132414@icann.org> <CFEF8F6B-9136-4B4C-B6DE-0E635786A240@akamai.com> <rt-4.4.3-21493-1544578196-1273.1132414-37-0@icann.org> <B8FCF390-4B0A-46BC-B3AB-E92A7C7D4FCF@akamai.com> <rt-4.4.3-23334-1544633480-1124.1132414-37-0@icann.org> <rt-4.4.3-4154-1544656355-1253.1132414-37-0@icann.org> <6D19FB88-FBA8-4F50-A004-067AE6218344@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [Tls-reg-review] [IANA #1132414] Re: Request to register TLS integrity only cipher suites for TLS 1.3
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Digging up this old thread since we may have to revisit the DTLS-OK
value...
My AD review of draft-ietf-tls-dtls13 notes that the mechanism for sequence
number encryption makes some assumptions on the underlying cipher of the
AEAD construction.  One proposal for changing the draft to make different
assumptions that are more future-proof may involve setting DTLS-OK to 'N'
for these ciphers (https://github.com/tlswg/dtls13-spec/pull/166/files).
Regardless, the authors of this draft might do well to provide some
indication of the expected sequence number (non-)protection mechanism.

-Ben

On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 03:55:03AM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> DLTS-OK is Y
> 
> On 12/12/18, 6:12 PM, "Sabrina Tanamal via RT" <iana-prot-param@iana.org> wrote:
> 
>     Hi Rich, all, 
>     
>     Sorry we have one more question. Can you let us know how to fill in the "DTLS-OK" column in the TLS Cipher Suites registry?
>     
>     Thanks,
>     
>     Sabrina Tanamal (filling in for Amanda)
>     Senior IANA Services Specialist
>     
>     On Wed Dec 12 16:51:20 2018, rsalz@akamai.com wrote:
>     > To avoid creating new holes, how about right after dragonfly:
>     > 0xC0,0xB3       TLS_ECCPWD_WITH_AES_256_CCM_SHA384      Y       N
>     > [RFC-harkins-tls-dragonfly-03]
>     > 0xC0,0xB4-FF    Unassigned
>     > 
>     > On 12/11/18, 8:29 PM, "Amanda Baber via RT" <iana-prot-
>     > param@iana.org> wrote:
>     > 
>     > Hi Rich,
>     > 
>     > Which values should we assign? There are a number of ranges available,
>     > and I haven't been able to find any text in RFC 8447 or RFC 8446 that
>     > identifies which section is for "Not Recommended" assignments:
>     > 
>     > https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
>     > parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4
>     > 
>     > Thanks for your patience,
>     > 
>     > Amanda Baber
>     > Lead IANA Services Specialist
>     > 
>     > On Tue Dec 11 20:34:22 2018, rsalz@akamai.com wrote:
>     > > We discussed this and approve.  Please assign two numbers in the "not
>     > > recommended" space.
>     > >
>     > > Thanks!
>     > >
>     > > On 12/5/18, 2:54 PM, "Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing)"
>     > > <ncamwing@cisco.com> wrote:
>     > >
>     > > > Contact Name:
>     > > > Nancy Cam-Winget
>     > > >
>     > > > Contact Email:
>     > > > ncamwing@cisco.com
>     > > >
>     > > > Type of Assignment:
>     > > > "Not Recommended" TLS Cipher suite assignment
>     > > >
>     > > > Registry:
>     > > > TLS 1.3 cipher suite
>     > > >
>     > > > Description:
>     > > > At least two IoT (ODVA and IEC) forums are requesting the need for
>     > > > enabling TLS 1.3 with integrity only protection in the data plane.
>     > > > Under security considerations, we are not recommending this cipher
>     > > > suite to be widely used and note that no privacy is provided when
>     > > > this
>     > > > cipher suite is used and several use cases have been noted where
>     > > > privacy is not required.
>     > > >
>     > > > Additional Info:
>     > > > We have noted the use cases and security (and privacy)
>     > > > considerations
>     > > > in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camwinget-tls-ts13-
>     > > > macciphersuites-01 as well as how the cipher suite would be used
>     > > > with
>     > > > TLS 1.3
>     > >
>     > >
>     > >
>     > > _______________________________________________
>     > > tls-reg-review mailing list
>     > > tls-reg-review@ietf.org
>     > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls-reg-review
>     > >
>     > >
>     > 
>     > 
>     > 
>     
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