Re: [TLS] Future interoperability issues for HRR for new extensions; Was: UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Wed, 21 February 2018 14:21 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 06:20:24 -0800
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
Cc: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Future interoperability issues for HRR for new extensions; Was: UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> (The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 6:10 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote: > On 02/21/2018 05:46 AM, Hubert Kario wrote: > > On Friday, 16 February 2018 18:06:41 CET The IESG wrote: > >> The IESG has received a request from the Transport Layer Security WG > (tls) > >> to consider the following document: - 'The Transport Layer Security > (TLS) > >> Protocol Version 1.3' > >> <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24.txt> as Proposed Standard > > Section 4.1.2 currently states that the only changes allowed to the > second > > ClientHello message (in HelloRetryRequest case) are: > > - replacing key_share > > - removing early_data > > - adding cookie > > - updating pre_shared_key > > - adding, removing or changing padding > > > > What about extensions undefined now? What if in the future we have > another > > extension like the PSK extension that needs to be updated for the second > > ClientHello? > > > > Do we accept that the above list is set in stone and will never change > (except > > for new protocol versions), requiring all future extensions to also > require > > the same extension payload for first and second ClientHello? > > > > It seems to me that such a hypothetical future extension could include a > signaling value in the HRR to indicate that the server understands the > new extension, and the semantics of the extension defined such that when > the server understands the extension the client may change its value > between ClientHello1 and ClientHello2. > > This might be slightly inefficient if the extension's information flow > is only from client to server, but I think it would be a compatible way > to allow an extension value to change after HRR. > Yes. Also, there's not really any good reason to change an extension that is not mentioned in HRR. -Ekr > -Ben > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- [TLS] UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24… The IESG
- Re: [TLS] UPDATED Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-tls1… Sean Turner
- [TLS] Future interoperability issues for HRR for … Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Future interoperability issues for HRR … Benjamin Kaduk
- [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: UPDAT… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] Future interoperability issues for HRR … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Tony Putman
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] external PSK identity enumeration Re: U… Hubert Kario