[TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sat, 03 September 2016 19:54 UTC
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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 03 Sep 2016 12:54:00 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624 We currently have code points assigned for user_mapping [RFC4681] client_authz [RFC5878] server_authz [RFC5878] These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that they are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll merge this PR end of next week. -Ekr
- [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from … Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from … Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from … Andrei Popov
- Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from … Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from … Sean Turner
- Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from … Yuhong Bao