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Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sat, 03 September 2016 23:08 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 03 Sep 2016 16:07:17 -0700
Message-ID: <CABcZeBNay3wFOixTTnhQXW6VfSCWaev+BW_dw9eGHbtM=7PuwQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
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Thanks for flagging this. Looks like it can just go right before
Certificate in the client's second flight...

-Ekr


On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 2:44 PM, Andrei Popov <Andrei.Popov@microsoft.com>
wrote:

> Hi Eric,
>
>
>
> MS TLS stack uses the user_mapping extension (to map TLS clients to
> Windows domain users). We do not implement client/server_authz.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Andrei
>
>
>
> *From:* TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rescorla
> *Sent:* Saturday, September 3, 2016 12:54 PM
> *To:* tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* [TLS] PR #624: Remove Supplemental Auth from TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/624
>
>
>
> We currently have code points assigned for
>
>
>
>  user_mapping [RFC4681]
>
>  client_authz [RFC5878]
>
>  server_authz [RFC5878]
>
>
>
> These aren't well-specified for use in TLS 1.3 and my sense is that they
>
> are barely used. Any objections to just banning them? If not, I'll merge
> this
>
> PR end of next week.
>
>
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

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