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Re: [TLS] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-09.txt> (Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3) to Proposed Standard

Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> Sat, 02 October 2021 03:18 UTC

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Date: Fri, 01 Oct 2021 23:18:02 -0400
From: Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com>
To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: Last Call: <draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-09.txt> (Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3) to Proposed Standard
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No, I am saying that I have seen people implement custom solutions to
problems in an RFC because they don't realize that there is a related
RFC that fixes those problems (or suggests how to do whatever tangential
thing they needed to implement). Having a link in the related RFCs make
things easier to discover.

In this case, if I was someone wanting to, for example, implement
channel binding between TLS and some sort of authentication token so
that the token would not remain valid if the TLS session changed, I
would probably go to the TLS spec to see if such a thing exists. If that
spec doesn't contain the "Updated by" link, I don't think it's as likely
that I'd find that there was a standard way to do this.

—Sam

On Fri, Oct 1, 2021, at 23:11, Rob Sayre wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 1, 2021 at 8:04 PM Sam Whited <sam@samwhited.com> wrote:
>
>> I have to respectfully disagree with this.
>>
>> Anecdotally, RFCs are hard to discover.
>
>
>
> What do you mean, exactly, here?
>
> Are you saying that this draft “update” 8446 in order for readers to
> understand it and 8446 itself?

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