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Re: [TLS] Support of integrity only cipher suites in TLS 1.3

Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> Thu, 06 April 2017 11:12 UTC

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From: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2017 07:12:24 -0400
Message-ID: <CAJU8_nVYkiUYJ483hv9E-i34i1-SROSfwktuTX2=ZKXVD9sH9A@mail.gmail.com>
To: "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com>
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Support of integrity only cipher suites in TLS 1.3
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On Apr 6, 2017 4:08 AM, "Fries, Steffen" <steffen.fries@siemens.com> wrote:

You  are right, I did not take that option into account. But as you
mentioned, it is non-standard and with the desire is to be interoperable as
most as possible, proprietary enhancements are likely not to be favored.

>From a security standards perspective, interoperability by-default is
expressly *undesirable* for this mode of operation. We want this to break
for anyone who hasn't gone through the trouble of explicitly opting-in.

This seems to be a perfect case for the "allow registration of code points,
but do not standardize or recommend" approach: the mechanism is possible to
implement in a way that respects IANA namespacing by those parties with
special needs requiring it, but the risk that someone will accidentally
implement it in a stack used in end-user software is minimal.

Kyle

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