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Re: [TLS] security considerations for draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts

Simon Friedberger <simon.tls@a-oben.org> Wed, 05 April 2017 12:39 UTC

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From: Simon Friedberger <simon.tls@a-oben.org>
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Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 14:39:17 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] security considerations for draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
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I agree, that's why I only see a security gain if the theft of the
certificate remains undetected.


On 05/04/17 14:35, Salz, Rich wrote:
>>    Server operators
>>    often want to create short-lived certificates for servers in low-
>>    trust zones such as CDNs or remote data centers.
> But as currently specified, that low-trust short-lived certificate, if captured, can be used to spoof the operator anywhere else in the world.  Yes, for a shorter time than the long-lived "true" key, but this still seems like a footgun.
>

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