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Re: [TLS] security considerations for draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Wed, 05 April 2017 12:36 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Simon Friedberger <simon.tls@a-oben.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] security considerations for draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
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Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 12:35:59 +0000
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References: <m27f362zxm.fsf@dhcp-89ad.meeting.ietf.org> <MWHPR15MB1455F0758BE196CAB4BDF8BDB6360@MWHPR15MB1455.namprd15.prod.outlook.com> <c5799647-4568-4cbf-1708-52934a961f67@akamai.com> <d93fe5c1-5236-f86c-34d0-2606204d672d@a-oben.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] security considerations for draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
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>    Server operators
>    often want to create short-lived certificates for servers in low-
>    trust zones such as CDNs or remote data centers.

But as currently specified, that low-trust short-lived certificate, if captured, can be used to spoof the operator anywhere else in the world.  Yes, for a shorter time than the long-lived "true" key, but this still seems like a footgun.

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