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Re: [TLS] TLSv1.2 - Is zero signature allowed in client CertificateVerify message?

M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> Wed, 04 September 2019 09:49 UTC

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From: M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 04 Sep 2019 17:48:53 +0800
Message-ID: <CAG5P2e9U+pobdPz8w7NKNEFXLG9SqN3eHkrHv8ykz6gisn2xkw@mail.gmail.com>
To: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Cc: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLSv1.2 - Is zero signature allowed in client CertificateVerify message?
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Thank David.

I originally encountered the zero bytes in the signature field (the
screenshot I posted in my mail) with a client device during client cert
auth.

Android Version: 6.0.1
Hardware: samsung SM-T580 (Galaxy Tab A6)

It was sending proper client Certificate, but it was sending client
CertificateVerify with zero bytes in the signature.  Hence I was wondering
whether this behaviour is allowed or not as per TLS 1.2 RFC. (for e.g. when
the client encountered an error condition; in such cases ideally I expect
the client to terminate the connection with an alert like you suggested).

Looks like a bug on the client side then.

with regards,
Saravanan

On Tue, 3 Sep 2019 at 23:40, David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> wrote:

> The client should just abort the handshake and probably send an alert like
> internal_error since it cannot usefully proceed.
>
> On Tue, Sep 3, 2019 at 11:27 AM M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Thanks Richard for the reply.  Let me rephrase my question:
>>
>> If a client encounter any error condition (e.g. does not have access to
>> the private key for whatever reason) in generating the signature, can it
>> send zero bytes in the signature field of CertificateVerify message to
>> indicate the error condition?  Is this allowed in TLS 1.2 RFC?
>>
>> with regards,
>> Saravanan
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 3 Sep 2019 at 22:36, Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:
>>
>>> I don't believe that's a valid signature according to rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
>>> so yeah, this is probably an error.
>>> --Richard
>>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 1, 2019 at 11:33 PM M K Saravanan <mksarav@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> Is zero signature allowed in client CertificateVerify message (I am
>>>> guessing may be to indicate error condition??). I don't see any thing
>>>> related to zero signature in the TLS 1.2 RFC (or may be I am not looking
>>>> into the right section?)
>>>>
>>>> Today I saw a packet like this and server was terminating the
>>>> connection due to the failure of client cert auth. (because of zero
>>>> signature in client cert verify message).
>>>>
>>>> [image: image.png]
>>>>
>>>> Under what circumstances a client can send a zero signature in the
>>>> client CertificateVerify message?  Is this behaviour TLS 1.2 RFC compliant?
>>>>
>>>> with regards,
>>>> Saravanan
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>

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