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Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Fri, 16 May 2014 03:32 UTC

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Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 20:32:47 -0700
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com>
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Cc: ietf tls <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI
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On Wed, May 14, 2014 at 11:38 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 5/14/14, Christian Huitema <huitema@huitema.net> wrote:
>>> If a comprehensive solution to the surveillance problem also involve
>> changes to
>>> plug leaks by DNS, wouldn't it be reasonable that the TLS portion of the
>> solution
>>> depends on the DNS bits being deployed as well?
>>
>> This is a bit close to the "your side of the boat is leaking more than
>> mine"
>> argument. Let's plug both leaks, and not have each wait for the other.
>
> That's what Fabrice was suggesting.  (Specifically: the pieces of text
> quoted in that message describe solutions to the TLS leaks which
> depend on having extra information pre-distributed in DNS.)

It's a little more subtle than that. Options 3 and 1 have the same
security absent DNSSEC, but different performance, with Option 1
requiring an extra round trip. However, Option 3 requires
administrative action on the part of a website to work. The payoff
depends on DNSSEC.

So right now I see Option 1 or 3 as our best bet, with very limited
real world impact.

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd




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"Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little
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