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Re: [TLS] Why are the brainpool curves not allowed in TLS 1.3?

Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com> Thu, 19 July 2018 10:27 UTC

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From: Johannes Merkle <johannes.merkle@secunet.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Why are the brainpool curves not allowed in TLS 1.3?
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>> Code points for pre-1.3 were assigned, and they are invalid for TLS 1.3.  Those “you should not send these for 1.3” could be re-used for TLS 1.3, if that was desired.
> 
> Yes this makes sense. And I think that they should, documented as something other than “Recommended”.
> 

I still don't get it. If the existing code points are re-used, the TLS 1.3 standard is violated.

Johannes

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