Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Sat, 15 July 2017 06:14 UTC

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: "Salz\, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>, Matthew Green <matthewdgreen@gmail.com>, Nick Sullivan <nicholas.sullivan@gmail.com>, "tls\@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2017 08:12:42 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] draft-green-tls-static-dh-in-tls13-01
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On Sat 2017-07-15 05:58:31 +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> Unless I missed the reply, I did not see any answer to my question as
> to why it must be opt-in.  Do we think evildoers will tell the truth
> about what they are doing?

Because presumably the people who do *not* want to do evil want to avoid
specifying a mechanism that will be widely implemented that could leak
into use outside of the intended scenario.  right?

As far as i can tell, we're all in agreement here that:

 * This proposed TLS variant is *never* acceptable for use on the public
   Internet.  At most it's acceptable only between two endpoints within
   a datacenter under a single zone of administrative control.

 * Forward secrecy is in general a valuable property for encrypted
   communications in transit.

If there's anyone on the list who disagrees with the above two
statements, please speak up!

        --dkg