Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend

Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> Sun, 15 November 2009 17:59 UTC

From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
In-Reply-To: <20091115113857.4E04D69F7B2@kilo.networkresonance.com>
References: <AC1CFD94F59A264488DC2BEC3E890DE5091A760A@xmb-sjc-225.amer.cisco.com> <20091115113857.4E04D69F7B2@kilo.networkresonance.com>
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Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 09:59:19 -0800
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend
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On Nov 15, 2009, at 3:38 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:

> So, thinking further on my earlier message, I think the following
> elaboration will work a bit better:
>
> - Strict clients (those which wish to insist on RI) generate RI on
>  initial handshake. As I said earlier, I don't think this is
>  useful, but it works.
>
> - Lenient clients do not generate RI on initial handshake but do
>  generate it on rehandshake with TLS 1.0+ only.
>  + Moderately lenient clients can fail if the server does not
>    do RI.
>  + Really lenient clients can ignore the server's failure to
>    do RI.

Yes, please.  I was going to send an email asking for this, but you  
beat me at it.

Bodo

[TLS] To extend or not to extend Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Eric Rescorla
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Bodo Moeller
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Martin Rex
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nicolas Williams
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nelson B Bolyard
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nelson B Bolyard
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Bodo Moeller
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nelson B Bolyard
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Bodo Moeller
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Eric Rescorla