Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend
Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me> Sun, 15 November 2009 21:12 UTC
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Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2009 13:14:31 -0800
From: Nelson B Bolyard <nelson@bolyard.me>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend
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On 2009-11-15 03:38 PDT, Eric Rescorla wrote: > So, thinking further on my earlier message, I think the following > elaboration will work a bit better: > > - Strict clients (those which wish to insist on RI) generate RI on > initial handshake. As I said earlier, I don't think this is > useful, but it works. > > - Lenient clients do not generate RI on initial handshake but do > generate it on rehandshake with TLS 1.0+ only. > + Moderately lenient clients can fail if the server does not > do RI. > + Really lenient clients can ignore the server's failure to > do RI. Aren't your so-called Lenient clients still 100% vulnerable to the attack? What prevents their initial handshakes from being used by an attacker as renegotiations with a vulnerable server?
- [TLS] To extend or not to extend Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nicolas Williams
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Nelson B Bolyard
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Bodo Moeller
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] To extend or not to extend Eric Rescorla