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Re: [TLS] New Draft: Using DNS to set the SNI explicitly

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Tue, 14 March 2017 07:34 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 03:34:25 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New Draft: Using DNS to set the SNI explicitly
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On Friday, March 10, 2017 10:29:30 am Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> Instead of looking for a kludgey replacement SNI in DNS (that won't get deployed,
> and provides rather weak obfuscation) it seems more sensible to publish keys in
> DNS that make it possible to encrypt the entire client HELLO, SNI and all.

+1

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