Re: [TLS] New Draft: Using DNS to set the SNI explicitly

Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com> Fri, 10 March 2017 13:15 UTC

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From: Ryan Sleevi <ryan-ietftls@sleevi.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2017 13:15:26 +0000
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To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>, mrex@sap.com
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Subject: Re: [TLS] New Draft: Using DNS to set the SNI explicitly
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On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 7:33 AM Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> CABrowser-Forum defines the rules which browsers implemenent on
> top of rfc2818 section 3.1 server endpoint identity checks
> of server certificates.


This is neither accurate nor correct. The CA/Browser Forum neither
describes nor dictates browser behaviour.

Perhaps you are thinking RFC 6125, but since you've stated this multiple
times, I can only believe this is an honest mistake, but one that deserves
calling out.

btw. SNI explicitly excludes IPv4 and IPv6 address matching that
> is defined in rfc2818 section 3.1 as alternatives to DNS Hostname
> matching.


Could you clarify the relevance of this to the discussion? While it serves
as a useful reminder for those who may have forgotten, I'm at a loss as to
how this has any relevance or impact to the conversation thus far or the
discussion of tradeoffs, so I must be missing something quite basic.

>
>