Re: [TLS] Version (in)tolerance

[Peter Gutmann <[e-mail]>]

Marsh Ray <[e-mail]> writes:

>* If an optional protocol feature has no implementations that are available
>and widely used for testing, it can be relied on not to work.

And that's exactly why I reject major versions other than 3, I have no idea
what version 4 will be or require, and I also have no way of checking that I'm
not subject to some sort of rollback attack or who knows what if I include
handling for a 4.x version.  So in order to force users to get a version that
deals with whatever security catastrophe 4.x is meant to address, I want to
make sure that they're forced to upgrade.

This was a problem with PGP 2.x, there was never any strong reason for people
to upgrade, and it took forever to get people to move off it (some are still
using it).  Someone (from memory it was Jon Callas) has complained that PGP
2.x needed some fatal flaw found in it to force people to finally move to
OpenPGP.  So having a fall-over-and-die trigger can be a good thing, not a
flaw.

In any case though since no-one has any idea what 4.x will be, or why we'd
need to move to it, or whether it will ever appear, this is all just
speculation, it's like arguing over what clothes work best for interstellar
travel.

Peter.