RE: [TLS] Please discuss: draft-housley-evidence-extns-00 (resend)

[Ari Medvinsky <[e-mail]>]

I agree with Stefan.  In general I see a lot of potential for signature
support in TLS for commerce, non-repudiation and secure audit scenarios.
The term evidence brings in a legal discussion that clearly does not
belong here.

Ari Medvinsky
Sr. Program Manager
Windows Security

-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Brown [mailto:[e-mail]] 
Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2006 9:20 AM
To: [e-mail]
Subject: RE: [TLS] Please discuss: draft-housley-evidence-extns-00
(resend)

Stefan, (resend, to [e-mail], with additions to the first paragraph)

Thanks for your helpful comments.  I don't agree entirely with you,
specifically your position that signatures are (must be?) application
level
constructs, but you're probably in the majority on this issue.  My
opinion
is based on personal experience though.  I am working on a router
project
that uses TLS Evidence and Authorizations at the TLS level only:

http://www.navysbir.com/06_1/215.htm

The router works below the application-level and aims at high assurance
under Common Criteria, e.g. EAL6.  Its design and implementation has
been
and will continue to be carefully scrutinized.  This project does not
depend
on "signer's intent" though, and perhaps intent is what you locate at
the
application level?

I think you're right about this: the wisest choice may be to wait and
see
how things pan out in the legal community, and not try to extract a
final
answer from them too soon.  Would the TLS WG be willing to extend the
charter for evidence even if a large part of the discussion was hosted
by a
lawyer community and could take some time to hash out?

For those of you who are interested in the legal aspect of "evidence", I
am
currently engaged in conversation with the American Bar Association's
Information Security Committee listserv.  If you would like to enter
that
discussion, please let me know.  

The ABA ISC discussion has recently rehashed the use of the term
"evidence"
with respect to TLS Evidence.  To summarize that discussion as fairly as
I
can, I think as long as one spells evidence with a lowercase "e" and not
as
Evidence or EVIDENCE the lawyers on the ISC listserv are comfortable
with
the term.  I also plan to work closely with the ABA Digital Evidence
Project
over the next year as well, and my first project with DEP is to hash out
terms together.

The following is a snippet -- really, a teaser -- for those of you with
some
inclination to join the ABA ISC group:

(mark)
> The TLS definition of "evidence" is unstated to allow it to flex with
the
> prevailing 
> definition in the legal world (this decade's definition or the
next's).
> 
> You say the definition of evidence is anything that can be "thrown
into
> the
> pot", which seems reasonable to me.
> 
(Steven Teppler)
> > First, what is unknown is the definition of "evidence" as the
technical
> > protocol means it.  In the legal world, anything can be, and usually
> > thrown
> > into the pot as, evidence.  How is this specie of evidence different
> from
> > other evidence?
> 
(mark)
> TLS Evidence does not claim some special privilege e.g. being
> non-repudiable.  It's just evidence like everything else in the pot.
The
> specter of duress is never eliminated, for example.  How could it be?
> Neither does TLS Evidence claim any special privileges to magically
gain
> affirmatives to any of the following:
>
(Steven Teppler)
> > Is EG'd evidence automatically admissible?  Does it
> > automatically exclude contradictory digital data or testimony?  Does
it
> > generate enough evidence to survive a summary judgment motion?  Does
it
> > satisfy a burden of production?  Burden of persuasion?  If so, why
isn't
> > some modifier, such as "trusted evidence" or "summary judgment
> eliminator"
> > used?
> 
(mark)
> No thank you!  If a court chose to admit TLS Evidence into a trial
then
> that
> court could examine it as a record like anything else.  The TLS
Evidence
> draft standard _only_ defines a minimum technical standard for
security
> measures including cryptographic/equality tests which must be passed
> before TLS Evidence is "born".

Best regards,

mark


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